A framework for evaluating application of smart cards and related technology within the Department of Defense by Spegele, Joseph Brian
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1994-09
A framework for evaluating application of smart
cards and related technology within the Department
of Defense
Spegele, Joseph Brian
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/43027









... , .. -... ~ ..... _ ......... -----· 
A Framework for Evaluating Application of Smart 
Cards and Related Technology Within the 
Department of Defense 
by 
Joseph Brian Spegele 
September, 1994 
Co-Advisors: Carl R. Jones 
Dan C. Boger 
Roger Stemp 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
19950117 025 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
. . ' 
Public r~port•ng burd~n for thts colle-ct•on of anformatton_•s est• mat~ to aw~rag~ 1 t-.our per response, tncluding tt'l~ time for rev•ew•ng instructions. search~ng ex•strng data !.Ources. 
gathenng and matntatntng the data nt"@ded, and complettng and revt~w•ng the collection of tnfOrmatton. Send comments r~arding this burden estimate or any other a~ct of thiS 
collt'<t•on of informatton, mclud~ng suggestions for reducing thts burden. to Washtngton HeadQuarte~ Services. Directorate or Information Operat•ons and Reports, 1215 Jetfe~n 
DaviS H•ghway. Su•te 1204. Arlington. VA 22202-4302. and to the Office of Management and Budget. Paperwork Reduction PrOJect (0704-0188), Wash•ngton, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) ,2. f~~Hr,T s>epTfember 13. REPRf.IsT~F'~ tt\{!~~TES COVERED 
4. TITL_E AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
A Framework for Evaluating Application of Smart Cards and 
Related Technology Within the Department of Defense 
6. AUTHOR(S) 
Spegele, Joseph Brian 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER 
Monterey, CA 93943-5000 
9. SPONSORING I MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING I MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION I AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. A 
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) 
The author presents a new framework for evaluating the evolutionary upgrade paths of card 
technologies. Many functions which are now either not being done, or are being done manually, could 
be automated using card technologies. There is a revolution underway in card technologies, making 
them viable solutions to an expanding set of problems. The author examines these card technology 
initiatives, the shrinking defense budget, card selection issues, card authentication techniques, and 
evolutionary acquisition. 
Conclusions stress that card technology systems can be viewed as evolutionary upgrade paths 
that change over time. Simple cost benefit analysis does not capture the evolving nature of advancing 
technology. Effective evaluations of evolutionary card systems must consider this temporal 
component, and a framework, such as the one presented in this thesis, is needed for comparing 
alternative card systems. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS 
Smart cards, Card technology, Evolutionary acquisition, 
Migration, Migratory systems 





15. NUMBER OF PAGES 
1 q4 
16. PRICE CODE 
20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT 
UL 
Standard Form 298 {Rev 2-89) 
Presc"bed by ANSI Std Z39-18 
298· 102 
..... 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
A Framework for Evaluating Application of Smart Cards and Related Technology 
Within the Department of Defense 
by 
Joseph B. Spegele 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1988 
Submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 










The author presents a new framework for evaluating the evolutionary upgrade 
paths of card technologies. Many functions which are now either not being done, or are 
being done manually, could be automated using card technologies. There is a revolution 
underway in card technologies, making them viable solutions to an expanding set of 
problems. The author examines these card technology initiatives, the shrinking defense 
budget, card selection issues, card authentication techniques, and evolutionary acquisition. 
Conclusions stress that card technology systems can be viewed as evolutionary 
upgrade paths that change over time. Simple cost benefit analysis does not capture the 
evolving nature of advancing technology. Effective evaluations of evolutionary card 
systems must consider this temporal component, and a framework, such as the one 
presented in this thesis, is needed for comparing alternative card systems. 
Accesion For 












TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
A PURPOSE OF THESIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
C. OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
1. Chapter II 
2. Chapter III 
3. Chapter IV 
4. Chapter V 
5. Chapter VI 
6. Chapter VII 
Technology Performance Issues . . . . . . . 4 
Card Technology Overview . . . . . . . . . 4 
Authentication Techniques. . . . . . . . . . 4 
New Framework Background . . . . . . . . 4 
A Framework For Card Selection. . . 5 
Conclusions And Recommendations. . . . . 5 
II. TECHNOLOGY PERFORMANCE ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 
A INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
B. BACKGROUND ON CARD SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ISSUES. . 6 
C. DISCUSSION OF ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
1. Security Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
a. Level of Security Required Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
b. Types of Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
c. Error Tolerance Considerations. 11 
2. Memory Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
a. Amounts ofData to be Stored . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
b. Speed ofData Transfer ....................... 16 
c. Data Storage Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
3. Processing Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
4. Interface Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
5. Durability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 
a. Durability of Cards and of Card Interface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 
b. Durability of Card Readers and Authenticating Devices. . 20 
6. User Acceptance ............................ 20 
a. Acceptance of Authentication Technique .............. 21 
b. Acceptance of Card Technology. .21 
7. Scalability and Expandability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 
8. Application Specific Attributes ..................... 22 
9. System Life Expectancy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
10. Cost Estimations ............................ 23 
a. Reuse of Current Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
b. Cost Estimation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
lV 
c. Acquisition and Procurement . . . 25 
d. Hardware and Software . . . . . . 26 
e. Data Capture . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
f Operations and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
g. Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 
h. Application Specific Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
11. Risk Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 
12. Temporal Component. ........................ 29 
D. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
III. CARD TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW .................... 30 
A INTRODUCTION ............................. 30 
B. HISTORY OF CARD EVOLUTION ................... 30 
C. CARD TECHNOLOGIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
1. Bar Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
a. History . . . . . . . . . . 34 
b. System Descriptions . . . 35 
(1) Code 39 Bar Code. . 36 
(2) Code 128 Bar Code . 37 
(3) Universal Product Codes (UPC). 38 
( 4) Interleaved 2 of 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 
(5) Code 49 ............................ 39 
(6) Code 16K. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
(7) Other Symbologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
c. Common Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
d. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
e. Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
2. Magnetic Stripe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 
a. History ............................... 42 
b. System Description . . . 42 
c. Common Applications . . . 44 
d. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . 45 
e. Limitations . . . . . . . . . . 45 
3. Wiegand Technology Cards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 
a. History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 
b. System Description. . . 46 
c. Common Applications. . 47 
d. Capabilities . . . . . . . 48 
e. Limitations . . . . . . . 48 
4. Integrated Circuit Cards ........................ 49 
a. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 
b. Evolution of the IC Card . . . ................. 52 
v 
c. Contact Chip Cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 
(1) System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 
(2) IC Programmable Cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 
(a) Common Applications ................... 55 
(b) Capabilities . . . 56 
(c) Limitations ........................ 57 
(3) IC Memory Cards ....................... 58 
(a) Common Applications ................... 58 
(b) Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 
(c) Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 
(4) Super Smart Cards ....................... 59 
(a) Common Applications ................... 60 
(b) Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 
(c) Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 
d. Contactless Chip Cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 
( 1) System Description. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 
(2) IC Programmable Cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 
(a) Common Applications ................... 62 
(b) Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 
(c) Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 
(3) IC Memory Cards ....................... 64 
(a) Common Applications ................... 65 
(b) Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 
(c) Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 
e. PCMCIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 
( 1) System Description. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 
(2) Common Applications ..................... 67 
(3) Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 
(4) Limitations ........................... 67 
5. Optical Memory Cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 
a. History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 
b. System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69 
c. Common Applications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 69 
d. Capabilities . . . . 70 
e. Limitations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 
6. Hybrid Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 71 
a. History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 
b. System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 
c. Common Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 
d. Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 
e. Limitations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 
D. SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . ................. 74 
Vl 
IV. AUTHENTICATION TECHNIQUES .................... 76 
A INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 
B. BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 
C. AUTHENTICATION BY HUMAN INTERVENTION (MANUAL) ... 82 
1. Authentication of the Individual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 
a. Photograph . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 
b. Signature Block. . . . . . . . . . . . 83 
2. Authentication of the Access Device . . . 84 
a. Name Embossing. . . . . . . . . . . 84 
b. Holographic Seals and Images . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 
D. AUTHENTICATION BY MACHINE (AUTOMATED) . . . . . . . . . 85 
1. Authentication ofthe Individual. . . . . . . . . . _ . . . . . . . . . 85 
a. Personal Identificc.tion Number or Password . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 
(1) Fixed_ ............................. 85 
(2) Challenge and Response Systems ................ 85 
b. Physiological (Biometrics). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 
( 1) Fingerprint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 
(2) Hand Geometry Recognition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 
(3) Retinal Scan .......................... 91 
(4) Iris Scan ............................ 92 
(5) Face Recognition ........................ 93 
(6) Hand Vein Patterns ....................... 93 
(7) Other Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 
c. Behavioral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 
( 1) Signature Dynamics Verification . . 94 
(2) Keystroke Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 
(3) Voice Recognition ....................... 95 
2. Authentication of the Access Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 
a. Optical Character Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 
b. Magnetic Ink . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 
c. Electronically Verifiable Holograms . 98 
d. Cryptographic Techniques ..................... 99 
e. Zero-Knowledge Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 
E. SUMMARY OF AUTHENTICATION TECHNIQUES .......... 103 
V. NEW FRAMEWORK BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 
A INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 
B. EVOLUTIONARY MIGRATION CONCEPT .............. 104 
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT ................ 105 
1. National Performance Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 
2. Corporate Information Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 
Vll 
3. Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence 
for the Warrior. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 
4. DoD Directive 5000.1 and Instruction 5000.2 ............. 109 
5. Technical Architecture for Information Management .......... 110 
D. THEORIES AND CONCEPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 
1. Analytical Hierarchy Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 
2. Commercial-off-the-Shelf. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 
3. Open Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 
4. Discounting to Obtain Present Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 
5. Cost Analysis Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 
6. Risk Analysis Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 
E. SlTh1MARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 
VI. A FRAMEWORK FOR CARD SYSTEM SELECTION ........... 118 
A. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 
1. Framework Purpose and Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 
2. The Need for an Effective Evaluation Framework ........... 119 
3. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 
B. THEFRAMEWORK ........................... 120 
1. General Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 
2. Overall Framework View. 123 
3. Framework Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 
a. Define Target System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 
(1) Determine Functions and Technical Capabilities. 126 
(2) Determine Current and Base System .............. 127 
(3) Determine System Life Expectancy of Current or Base System. 128 
b. Establish Migratory Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 
(1) List Current or Base Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 
(2) List Target System Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 
(3) Construct Viable Paths to Target System ............ 130 
c. Develop and Apply Measures ofPerformance. . . . 132 
(1) Determine Performance Attributes and Scales. . . . . . . . . 132 
(2) Use AHP to Develop an Aggregate Measure of 
Performance (MOP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 
(3) Calculate the Aggregate MOP for Each Period ......... 136 
(4) Use AHP to Develop the Time Preference ofPerformance. . 137 
(5) Calculate Overall Time Weighted MOP for Each 
Migration Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7 
d. Develop and Apply Hierarchical Cost Model . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7 
(1) Determine Cost Elements Drivers ............... 138 
(2) Develop Hierarchical Cost Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 
(3) Calculate Costs for Each Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 
Vlll 
(4) Discount Costs to Obtain the Present Values of 
Life Cycle Cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 9 
(5) Calculate Present Value Life Cycle Cost for Each 
Migration Path ......................... 139 
e. Calculate Overall Net Values .................... 141 
(1) Use AHP to Develop MOP and Life Cycle Costs Preferences .. 141 
(2) Calculate Overall Net Values for Each Migration Path ..... 142 
f Select Migratory Path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 
( 1) Use Risk Analysis to Determine Likelihood of 
Path Occurrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 
(2) Calculate Net Expected Value for Each Migration Path. . . . 144 
(3) Select Path with Greatest Net Expected Value ......... 144 
g. Apply Selection and Reevaluate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 
(1) Initiate System Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 
(2) Reevaluate New State Using Framework Steps ......... 145 
C. CONCLUSIONS ............................. 146 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 
A. SUMMARY ........ _ ........................ 148 
B. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 148 





LIST OF ACRONYMS . 151 
GLOSSARY .......................... 155 
OTHER MOP SCALES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160 
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE . 163 
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 
IX 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Type I V s. Type II Error Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
Figure 2: Code 39 Bar Code ........................... 37 
Figure 3: Code 128 Bar Code . . . 37 
Figure 4: Universal Product Code . 38 
Figure 5: Interleaved 2 of 5 Bar Code 39 
Figure 6: Code 49 Bar Code ........................... 40 
Figure 7: Magnetic Stripe Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 
Figure 8: ICC Technologies Hierarchy . 
Figure 9: Contact Chip Card . . . . . . 
. 51 
. 54 
Figure 10: Super Smart Card ........................... 60 
Figure 11: Contactless IC Card, Interior View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 
Figure 12: Optical Memory Card . . . . . . . . . . . 
Figure 13: Hybrid Technology Card, Front and Back . 
. 69 
72 
Figure 14: Authentication Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 
Figure 15: Typical Encryption and Decryption Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 
Figure 16: Cost Performance Decision Curve . 121 
Figure 17: The Steps of the New Framework . 124 
Figure 18: The New Framework - Step 1: Define Current and Target Systems . 125 
Figure 19: The New Framework- Step 2: Establish Migratory Paths 129 
X 
Figure 20: Migration Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 
Figure 21: The New Framework - Step 3: Develop and Apply MOP 132 
Figure 22: Measures of Performance Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . 134 
Figure 23: The New Framework- Step 4: Develop and Apply Cost Model . 138 
Figure 24: Cost Model Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140 
Figure 25: The New Framework- Step 5: Calculate Overall Net Values ..... 141 
Figure 26: The New Framework- Step 6: Select Migratory Path . . . . . . . . 143 
Figure 27: The New Framework- Step 7: Apply Selection, Periodically Review . 145 
Figure 28: The New Framework Decision Hierarchy ............... 147 
XI 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF CARD TECHNOLOGIES ............. 75 
TABLE 2: SAMPLE FUNCTIONALITY VERSUS TECHNICAL 
CAPABILITY ............................ 127 
Xll 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE OF THESIS 
Economists argue that in the decades since the great depression, technology has been 
responsible for between two-thirds and three-quarters of all U.S. productivity growth. 1 
Technology can be defined as the "aggregation of capabilities, facilities, skills, knowledge, 
and organization required to successfully create a useful service or product. "2 The poten-
tial gains from technology are considerable. According to the Clinton administration's 
plan to" reinvent government, information technology will play a central role in streamlin-
ing federal bureaucracy. 3 To provide citizens with increased service at lower cost, the 
government needs to turn to new technology to reduce the needed human capital in the 
cost eguation.4 Smart cards are one of the new technologies in the Clinton strategy. 5 
Smart card technologies can permit significant shifts in the amount and method of 
1 Solow, Robert, as quoted in Allison, Graham and Gregory, Treverton, (eds.), 
Rethinking America's Security: Beyond Cold War to New World Order, W.W. Norton 
and Co., NY, 1992, p. 120. 
2 Branscomb, Lewis M., et al., Empowering Technology: Implementing a U.S. 
Strategy, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1993, p. 3. 
3 Anthes, Gary H., "Feds to Downsize With IT," ComputerWorld, Vol. 27, No. 37, 
September 13, 1993, p. 16. 
4 Toregas, Castis and Taly, Walsh, "Out With the Old, In With Re-engineering," 
American City & County, Vol. 108, No.6, May 1993, p. 49. 
5 Dreifus, Henry, "North American Smart Card Activities 1993," CardTech/SecurTech 
'93 Conference Proceedings, 1993, p. 353. 
1 
information which is acquired, stored, disseminated, and verified. Smart cards have the 
potential to revolutionize the way the Department of Defense (DoD) does business in 
many areas. They can centralize and automate functions which currently require expen-
sive equipment, facilities, and personnel. The potential for even further productivity 
growth is obvious, and in this age of right sizing the force and tightening budget con-
straints, effective use of available technology is essential. 
The purpose of this thesis is to present a new framework for evaluating alternative 
evolutionary upgrade paths for smart card related technologies. Card technology develop-
ment advances, combined with decreasing DoD budgets and force structure, necessitate 
this emphasis on effective, efficient use of available technology. The problem of system 
selection is complicated by the fact that routine business must continue while the new 
technology is incorporated. The constant technology advances, need for interim systems, 
and difficulty in assessing overall systems capability cause the card selection process to be 
one of an evolutionary nature. Evolutionary Acquisition is an acquisition strategy which 
may be used to procure a system expected to evolve during development, within an 
approved architectural framework to achieve overall system capability. "An underlying 
factor in Evolutionary Acquisition is the need to field a well defined core capability quickly 
in response to a validated requirement, while planning through an incremental upgrade 
program to eventually enhance the system to provide overall system capability. "
6 
6 Hirsch, Edward, BGen., USA (Ret.), "Evolutionary Acquisition of Command and 
Control Systems: Becoming a Reality," Signal, Vol. 42, No.5, January 1988, p. 23. 
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Evolutionary acquisition is well supported throughout the DoD, and will be discussed in 
depth in Chapter V. 
This framework of evaluating possible card technology uses is not all inclusive. The 
possible combinations of technology to requirements is limitless, constantly changing and 
constrained only by the designer's imagination. This framework will provide the decision 
maker with the tools necessary to evaluate candidate technological solutions. This thesis 
also provides the decision maker with background on the current state of card technology, 
authentication schemes, and card selection issues. 
B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The main focus of this thesis is to present a useful framework for evaluating evolution-
ary upgrade paths for card technology systems. To accomplish this it is necessary to pres-
ent a review of issues surrounding card technology selection, the state of card 
technologies currently, and authentication techniques. This background is accomplished in 
Chapters II, III, and IV respectively. While this is not intended to be the definitive history, 
current state and future predictions of card technologies, it does serve as a thorough intro-
duction to those not previously exposed to card technologies. To clarify concepts pres-
ented in the framework, an illustrative example is provided. 
A major issue the framework addresses is the difficult, ever-present temporal compo-
nent of card systems. The author proposes that effective evaluations of card technology 
systems must include an evaluation of its planned upgrade path toward some goal or tar-
get level offunctionality. 
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C. OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
1. Chapter ll - Card System Selection Issues 
This chapter discusses the important issues of card technology selection. Issues 
such as application attributes, security requirements, memory requirements, processing 
abilities, interface and interoperability, and legacy system are covered in detail. 
2. Chapter ill - Card Technology Overview 
The history and current state of card technologies are reviewed in this chapter. It 
provides an introduction to each of the most common card technologies, a briefhistory, 
some common applications, capabilities, and limitations. Those items most effecting card 
technology selection are highlighted. 
3. Chapter IV- Authentication Techniques 
The current state of user and card authentication techniques is discussed in this 
chapter. Topics include a discussion of biometric, behavioral, and visual user identifica-
tion techniques, as well as cryptographic card, and data authentication. 
4. Chapter V - New Framework Background 
This chapter lays the groundwork for the new framework. DoD initiatives relating 
to evolutionary acquisition, business process redesign, reinvention and applicable instruc-
tions, and directives are reviewed. Others concepts and theories which are used within the 
new framework are presented, including the analytical hierarchy process (AHP), cost 
estimation, risk analysis, and others. 
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5. Chapter VI - A Framework For Card Selection 
In this chapter, a new framework for evaluating evolutionary upgrade paths for 
smart card systems alternatives is presented. The framework is function oriented and 
capability based, which is intended to be a step-by-step method that produces valuable 
information about the upgrade paths of selected alternatives. The steps of the framework 
are presented along with recommended methods and procedures for accomplishing each 
step. In addition, illustrative examples of the framework being applied in several different 
scenarios is presented. 
6. Chapter VII - Conclusions And Recommendations 
The summary, conclusions, and recommendations of this thesis are presented in 
this chapter. 
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ll. TECHNOLOGY PERFORMANCE ISSUES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Choosing the best card technology for an application can be a daunting task. 
1 The 
number oftechnology options, sub-options, security options, and application alternatives 
can be overwhelming. Before any framework to assist with evolutionary migration to 
smart card technologies can be presented, an understanding of the issues involved in sys-
tern performance measures is essential. This chapter provides a discussion of the major 
issues of card technology performance, use, and evolution. This is not an exhaustive, all 
inclusive discussion of possible performance measures which could be used to select a 
card technology, but rather some background of issues the decision maker must be famil-
iar with and must consider before pursuing a migration to card technology systems. It will 
also provide the basis for the comparisons required to rate the performance of alternate 
technological solutions required within the new framework. 
B. BACKGROUND ON CARD SYSTEM PERFORMANCE ISSUES 
There have been several articles published on the selection of the right card solution 
for given applications. These articles have attempted to minimize the problem of card 
selection by centering around four or five major performance issues to be considered 
before selection. 2 While these five issues provide convenient categories to classify some 
1 Haddock, Robert, "Building the Right Card Solution into Your Application," 
CardTech/SecurTech '93 Conference Proceedings, 1993, p. 388. 
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ofthe major issues, there are several issues not addressed by these categories. In addition, 
there are many sub-issues to be discussed under each of these categories. The author con-
tends there are eight categories of performance issues, and four additional aspects of card 
systems which need to be evaluated in any meaningful assessment of technologies. Each 
of these 12 issues will be briefly introduced here and discussed in depth within this chap-
ter. The 12 categories are: 
1. Security Requirements - the level of security required in the system. Security 
should be a function of the amount of value the card can store or contain, the classi-
fication of the data stored on the card, the value and classification of material the 
card system allows access to and other factor'S. 'Security has several components --
card security, authentication of user, authentication of card, and computer system 
security. 
2. Memory Requirements - the type of data to be stored on the card. Memory should 
be a function of amount of data to be stored, how often data will be read and writ-
ten, how long the data will be retained, speed of data access requirements, backup 
scheme, and operating system size (if required). 
3. Processing Requirements- the logic capability (operating system) required on the 
card, if any. Processing requirements should be dependent on the level of complex-
ity of the functionality desired in system, speed requirements, and the security 
requirements of the system. 
4. Interface Requirements- the level of interface robustness is required. Interface 
requirements should be a function of the environment the card system will operate in 
(electromagnetic interference (EMI), line of sight (LOS), hands free, high speed, 
etc.), speed and amount of data transfer, and size of the card. 
5. Durability - the durability required in a card system. Durability is composed of sev-
eral components, the expected environment the card - reader interface will occur in, 
the cards storage environment, the reader location environment, the desired life of 
the card, and the life of the data stored on the card. 
2 Krueger, Julie, "Choosing the Right Chip For the Job," CardTech/SecurTech '94 
Conference Proceedings, 1994, pp. 237-242, and Haddock, 1993, pp. 381-390. 
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6. User Acceptance- the level of user acceptance of both the card technology and any 
authentication techniques used. User acceptance includes privacy issues, fear of 
bodily damage, misuse of data concerns, and ease of use. 
7. Scalability and Expandability- the amount to which the system can be modified 
or expanded in the future. Scalability and expandability should consider changes in 
the number of users, number of card acceptors, changes in requirements, functions, 
security, and memory capacity. Especially important consideration for migratory 
systems. 
8. Application Specific Attributes- any attribute which is required because of the 
intended application. 
9. System Life Expectancy- the useful life of the system. Life expectancy should be a 
function of optimal time to replace, card reader life, operation costs, and the like. 
10. Cost Estimations- the life cycle cost of the system. Cost estimations encompass 
the current infrastructure, what portion ofhardware, software, and data are reusable, 
number of card users and readers, training of users and operators, data capture, 
hardware, and software costs. Cost estimations also involve estimations of 
technology costs now and in the future, as well as economic outlook. 
11. Risk Assessment - the technology risks involved with choosing the technology. 
Risk assessment consists of the age ofthe technology, establishment of standards, 
the amount of vendor support, the amount of current application, the amount of 
infrastructure already established, and view of the future. 
12. Temporal Component- the value of time functionality achieved. 
Each of these twelve categories is captured within the new framework. The author 
believes these twelve categories better reflect the full spectrum of issues which must be 
considered when choosing a card technology system. 
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C. DISCUSSION OF ISSUES 
1. Security Requirements 
Security within a card system, in most applications, is the most important consider-
ation. The means of achieving security are as diverse as the types of card technologies 
themselves. Due to these facts, an entire chapter will be devoted to discussing authentica-
tion of cards and users. Chapter IV discusses in detail many of the aspects of security 
which are introduced here. 
a. Level of Security Required Considerations 
The level of security required in a system is a function of many factors. The 
most straight forward way to define the security necessary is to value what the card allows 
access to, and set the cost of the effort required to break security higher than this amount. 
Valuing the assets may be easy to do for some applications, such as a debit card systems 
that store a fixed dollar value. However, it is virtually impossible for other applications, 
such as those used to access a laboratory or computer system, or those that store highly 
classified data on the card. In addition to determining the adversary's cost ofbreaking 
security, it is also necessary to determine the likelihood of an attempt to break security. 
While the system may allow access to millions of dollars of equipment, if the desirability of 
access is low, there may be little likelihood of a security breach attempt, and therefore, it 
may be considered reasonable to take the risk associated with an attempt to break security. 
The level of security chosen should be based on a clear understanding of the 
situation, risks, desirability, and likelihood of occurrence, and a conscious decision should 
be made based on these factors. The DoD supports the use of a risk analysis to determine 
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the security threat. A risk assessment can provide the basis for and justification of, the 
chosen security level. 
b. Types of Security 
The level of security in a card system has several major components; the secu-
rity of the computer system (if used) which controls the card system, the security of the 
card itself, the security ofthe card reader, and any authentication ofthe user scheme 
employed. Security of electronic hardware such as the computers, card readers, and the 
data transfer between them is an issue inherent in any card system chosen. The security 
issues associated with electronic hardware and data transfer, as well as the security issues 
associated with the strength of locks, other accesses to the room, and the like will not be 
discussed here. The card system security issues which are dependent on the card 
technologies chosen, are of two main forms, authenticating the user, and authenticating 
the card used, and these will be discussed in detail. 
Card authentication can be accomplished in a number ofways. In its simplest 
form, card authentication consists only of the card being the correct size, shape, and type. 
Many systems use this simple, inexpensive method as a screening device for access to a 
more advanced system. An example is an automatic teller machine (ATM), which is inside 
an enclosure secured by a locked door that uses a simple card authentication method to 
grant access to the enclosure. The ATM itself uses a more sophisticated card authentica-
tion technique, such as checking the card number against a central database. 
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More sophisticated techniques, that require logic capable cards, include a num-
ber of cryptographic techniques that are discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV. 
Authentication of memory only, non-logic capable cards is possible as well. These 
memory only cards can have data stored on them using a specific encryption technique. If 
the data stored on the card is not in this form, the system knows the card is not authentic. 
The possible combinations of authentication or cryptographic techniques to card types is 
almost limitless. The decision maker needs to be aware of what security level the system 
provides, in order to properly compare alternate migratory paths. 
User authentication can likewise be accomplished in a number ofways. The 
most common forms of user authentication today are passwords and biometrics. User 
authentication techniques are strongly related to user acceptance issues, and will be dis-
cussed in greater detail within that category. Both user and card authentication techniques 
are discussed in Chapter IV as well. 
c. E"or Tolerance Considerations 
There are two types of errors which can be made by an authentication system, 
commonly called type I and type II. A type I error is the denial of an authentic user or 
card. These errors are also known as false rejections and are measured in terms of False 
Rejection Rates (FRRs). Type II errors are the authentication of a person or card which is 
not authentic. These errors are also known as false acceptance, and are measured in terms 
ofFalse Acceptance Rates (FARs). There is a relationship between these two types of 
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errors. Figure 1 displays the relationship between type I and type II errors in terms of 
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Figure 1 --Type I Vs. Type ll Errors 
Each technology employed for user or card authentication, has its own set of 
error curves. The optimal point for the system to operate at, is a function of the technolo-
gy chosen and the system designer's desires for security. If the desire is for high security 
with little regard for system availability, a system with low type II errors is appropriate, 
allowing the high type I errors to potentially make the system unavailable to authentic 
users. If, on the other hand, the system designer desires high system availability, with little 
regard for security, a system with low type I errors will be chosen, and the lower security 
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level will have to be accepted. In most systems, a happy medium is chosen between type I 
and II errors, and the authentication technique is chosen to ensure this desired level of 
security. 
Some user authentication technologies allow for the setting of the acceptance 
threshold. Sophisticated user authentication techniques do not obtain the unequivocal 
yes/no answer to an authentication that card techniques do, but rather rely on a "best fit" 
or "close-enough" match system. This allows the level at which the system rejects users to 
be changed. The greater the deviance from the reference data the system allows, the 
higher the type II error rate will be, and the lower the type I error rate. Conversely, more 
stringent requirements for deviance from reference data, lowers the type II error rate, but 
raises the type I error rate. 
2. Memory Requirements 
There are three major considerations which drive the memory requirement; how 
much data is to be stored, the speed of data transfer required, and the characteristics of the 
data itself The characteristics of the data include how often the data will be modified and 
how long the data needs to be retained. 
a. Amount of Data to be Stored 
Data capacity is the term used to define the amount of data the card technol-
ogy can store. The different card technologies presented in Chapter III have vastly differ-
ent abilities in the amount of data they can store. The terms and measures used for 
describing card data capacities are the same familiar terminology used for describing 
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personal computer (PC) capabilities. Memory is described in terms ofbytes, and can be 
expressed in thousands of bytes (KB) or millions of bytes (MB). A byte is eight bits, each 
bit being either a 1 or a 0. The combination of eight bits represents one character. A stan-
dard single spaced page of ASCII text averages about 4 KB.
3 
The amount of data needed to be stored on a card is a function of several fac-
tors. A driving force is whether the system to be implemented is to be a distributed or 
centralized system. In a distributed system, all the data required is stored directly on the 
card. In a centralized system, the data is stored in a central data base. There are advan-
tages and disadvantages to each of these schemes. 
Distributed systems are being hailed as the future for the computing develop-
ment agenda for this decade. 4 They have the advantage of reducing the communications 
between a card reader and the central computing system, thereby making it more difficult 
for an adversary to capture and use these communications. Distributed systems also allow 
increased flexibility in the system, by not forcing all data and processing to occur in one 
central location. On the other hand, distributed systems require cards with substantial 
memory capacities, especially if the data is to be encrypted. These cards usually are more 
costly, slower, and less reliable. Another major disadvantage of distributing the data to 
card technologies, is the potential for loss of these cards. Thorough backup schemes must 
3 Stanford, C.J., "What is a Smart Card," CardTech/SecurTech '93 Conference 
Proceedings, 1993, p. 123. 
4 Sprague, Ralph H., Jr., and Barbara C., McNurlin, Information Systems In Practice, 
3rd Ed., Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1993, p. 167. 
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be developed, so the data stored on the card can be recreated in the event the card is lost. 
Having to maintain backup files in this manner, limits the usefulness of having a distributed 
system. It remains to be seen if card technology systems migrate to a distributed environ-
ment as quickly as is being suggested. 
Centralized systems, in contrast, maintain all required data in a central data-
base, and do not depend on the card technologies to store data. This allows these systems 
to operate on any one of the low end, less expensive card technologies. Additionally, the 
data is centrally managed, allowing doser supervision over access to the database. How-
ever, the security vulnerabilities associated with a central database, as well as the data 
transfer between the database and peripheral equipment, are considerable. A hybrid card 
system, where some of the data resides on the card itself and some in a central database, is 
also possible. This is a common configuration when a single card is to be used to access 
multiple systems. 
For logic capable card systems, another consideration is the amount of memory 
storage capacity consumed by the operating system. The two major operating systems 
currently in use are the chip operating system (COS) and the multi-application chip oper-
ating system (MCOS). 5 Each of these operating systems consume a substantial amount of 
memory themselves, thereby reducing the amount of memory available to the application. 
Additionally, memory space is also required to be reserved for operating system use only, 
in order to store intermediate results, procedure steps, data, and the like. 
5 Stanford, "What is a Smart Card," 1993, p. 124. 
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b. Speed of Data Transfer 
Different card technologies have different data access and transfer rates. These 
rates determine the amount of time it will take to transfer data between the card and the 
card reader. The access and transfer speed required is dependent upon the length of time 
that is acceptable to transfer data between the card reader and the card during a typical 
interaction. This length oftime is referred to as the response time of the system. 
Response times in the half to several second range are generally considered acceptable. 
Faster response times make users question the error rate of the system, slower response 
times tend to agitate the user. 6 
c. Data Storage Characteristics 
There are two major considerations of data storage; how often the data will be 
modified, and how long the data needs to be retained. Data items that change frequently, 
such as addresses or balances, can be stored in a far different manner and even on a differ-
ent media, than items that do not change, such as date of birth or social security number. 
There are several different ways in which data can be stored on cards. A com-
mon form of memory is write once read many (WORM) technologies. These types of 
cards do not allow the data to be modified. Since the data is never erased, these cards 
provide some security, in the form of audit trails. WORM cards do allow data to be 
updated. This is accomplished by writing the new data on an unused portion of memory 
6 0ndrusch, Stephan, "Smallest and Fastest Implementation of Various Asymmetric 
Cryptographic Algorithms on Chip Cards," CardTech/SecurTech '94 Conference 
Proceedings, 1994, p. 63. 
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and changing a pointer from the former data space to the new memory space. Since the 
old memory space is now tagged as unusable, WORM technologies require greater data 
capacities because they actually consume the memory space as data is updated. These 
types of memory are better for non-changing data such as medical records. 
There are also read, write many memory types. These types allow memory 
spaces to be overwritten with new data. An example of this type of memory is the PC 
magnetic hard drive. This type does not consume memory space as updates are made, 
rather it writes the new data to a memory location, changes the pointer to this new data, 
and tags the old data memory space as available. How often the data is accessed (or read) 
does not effect data storage issues, but it does effect the interface requirements. 
3. Processing Requirements 
There are card technologies available today which possess a very capable inte-
grated circuit chip, running sophisticated operating system, which can accomplish difficult 
logic operations quickly. This ability to process information significantly increases the 
possible applications of card technology. In the future, these cards are sure to be faster, 
more powerful, and have larger data storage areas. Today, however, logic capable inte-
grated circuit cards are severely limited in usable memory area. These cards use up to 
about seven-eighths of their memory space for the operating system itself. This leaves 
only about eight KB of usable memory. Today, card system designers must choose 
between substantial memory space and logic ability, however this may change in the 
future. 
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Another problem with logic capable cards is the speed of memory access. If large 
amounts of data are to be transferred, a logic capability might not be desirable. The 
memory space on logic capable cards is controlled by the operating system on the card. 
Since these units typically operate with clock speeds of 3-5 MHz, 
7 they are is consider-
ably slower than systems which use a 33, 50, or 66 MHz card reader to access the 
memory space. The slower clock speed of the card chips needs to be weighed in any deci-
sions on having processing occurring on the card itself or within the reader. The greater 
the level of complexity of required operations, the longer card processing will take, and 
the slower the response times will be. Today, complex processing should be reserved for 
the higher speed reader systems, and not carried out onboard the card. 
The decision to use a logic capable card system also effects the security level. 
Logic cards are capable of more sophisticated cryptographic techniques discussed in 
Chapter IV. They are also generally harder to duplicate and can employ more verification 
and authentication techniques than other card systems. 
4. Interface Requirements 
The interface between the card and the card reader can be thought of as a continu-
ous spectrum, and will be referred to in this paper as interface robustness. On the low end 
of this scale are cards which must make physical contact with the card reader. On the 
opposite end of the spectrum are cards capable of high data transfer rates, with the card 
moving at a high rate of speed at a great distance away from the reader. This type of 
7 Peyret, Patrice, "RISC-Based, Next-Generation Smart Card Microcontroller Chips," 
CardTech/SecurTech '94 Conference Proceedings, 1994, p. 29. 
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interface is not available yet, but is projected to be in the not too distant future. In 
between are varying combinations of distance, transfer rates and card movement speeds. 
What amount of interface robustness is required in a system, is dependent on a 
number of factors. The first consideration should be the environment the reader-card 
interface will take place in. If this environment is a limiting one, such as with electro-
magnetic interference (EMI) or no line of sight (LOS), the interface will be required to be 
environment specific. The second factor to look at is any desired attributes of the applica-
tion. These include hands free operation, the card or reader moving at some speed, a set 
desired distance for reader-card interface, or other factors. 
5. Durability 
The durability required in the system should take into consideration several com-
ponents, such as the expected environment the reader -card interface will occur in, the 
card's storage environment, the environment at the reader location, and the desired life of 
the card and data stored on the card. The three components which make up the durability 
of the system as a whole are the durability of the individual components, including the 
reader, the card, and the interface between the two. 
a. Durability of Cards and of Card Interface 
The durability of the card itself is the card's resistance to damage. Most cards 
on the market today can stand a fair amount of abuse with out degradation in abilities. 
However, some cards are more durable than others. Major considerations for the cards is 
the environment they will be stored in. Most cards are kept in a wallet or worn on the 
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person. Common causes of damage to cards are magnetism, heat, flexing, bending or 
tearing, and scratching. Many card systems in use today replace the cards on a routine 
basis. This ensures the proper operation of the card when needed, and is normally not a 
large expense. 
Different card systems use different methods of reader-card interface. The 
interface is frequently the limiting factor in the life of the card, especially with card sys-
tems which use a physical contact type interface. The physical contact eventually wears 
down the card and makes it unusable. Cards with more robust interfaces, such as ones 
that use radio-frequency waves to communicate with the card reader, are not so limited. 
b. Durability of Card Readers and Authenticating Devices 
Another factor in the overall durability of the system is the durability of hard-
ware devices, such as cards readers and authentication input devices. These items are nor-
mally the most expensive components in the system, and are often used to determine the 
overall life expectancy of the card system itself. Most of these systems have mean times 
between failures of several years. Few require much maintenance or repair. Contact card 
readers may require the contact points to be replaced, but even these can last years 
depending on usage. 
6. User Acceptance 
User acceptance of the card system is an important aspect to consider. There are 
two main components ofuser acceptance; the acceptance of the card technology itself, 
and acceptance of any authentication technique used. 
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a. Acceptance of Authentication Technique 
Many authentication techniques in use today are not meeting with high level of 
user acceptance. The problems with authentication techniques include privacy issues, fear 
of bodily damage, misuse of data concerns, and ease of use. Generally speaking, the more 
familiar the activity used to authenticate with, the more the technique is accepted. Exam-
ples of familiar activity using techniques include; voice recognition systems, signature 
dynamics, facial recognition, and keystroke dynamics. Less familiar activities, such as reti-
nal and iris scans, fingerprinting, and hand vein pattern recognition enjoy lower user 
acceptance. 
Authentication techniques which require the user to subject their person to 
laser or ultrasound devices, such as retinal and iris scans or hand vein patterns, suffer from 
fear ofbodily damage. Users fear long term ill effects of the use of these devices, 
although there has been no data substantiating this fear as of yet. 
Privacy and misuse of data fears pervade almost all authentication techniques. 
Misuse of data revolves more around the data to be captured when using the system, such 
as hours of use, time of day, number oftimes per week, etc., but can also involve the ref-
erence data stored to conduct the authentication. Fingerprinting is a prime example of 
this, stemming from its long term use for law enforcement. 
b. Acceptance of Card Technology 
Most card technologies are widely accepted today, and people are eager to 
accept new technologies. Future technologies may not enjoy this level of acceptance. The 
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level of acceptance is also related to the amount of infrastructure already in place and the 
amount of familiarization not only users but operators as well have with the technology. 
The importance of card technology acceptance is less than that of the authentication 
technique. 
7. Scalability and Expandability 
The scalability and expandability of the system is the systems flexibility to handle 
changing requirements and numbers of users. Although requirements may be well known 
today, they may change over the life of the system. Systems in general, and evolutionary 
systems especially should be designed to meet changing needs. These includes expanding 
functionality, number of users, and number of card readers. The determination if a sys-
tems is expandable and scaleable may be difficult to make. Although the specifications 
may indicate the ability to handle the larger number of users, without placing the system 
under such a load, it is difficult to gauge true system performance. 
8. Application Specific Attributes 
The category of application specific attributes is provided as a convenient category 
to place any other desired attribute into. What needs to be considered in this category is 
dependent on the specific application the system is to be used for. For example, if the sys-
tem designer intends the card technology to be user as a visual identification device as well 
as its other functions, a card technology must be chosen which allows printing of a photo-
graph on the card. Room for a photograph would be placed in this category and weighted 
along with the other factors within the new framework. 
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9. System Life Expectancy 
System life expectancy is composed of many components. It is also a key factor in 
accomplishing meaningful card system evaluations. The measures of performance and 
costs need to be calculated for the expected life of the card system. The life expectancy 
can be limited by the security level in the system, the life expectancy of the hardware, or 
the life expectancy of the software and data. Evolutionary card systems may go through a 
number of software and card updates through their useful life. The cards themselves are 
relatively inexpensive, and card life is limited to a few years in most cases. Therefore soft-
ware and cards are not good items to base the expected life of the system on. Predicting 
when future technological innovations will cause the security level in the system to fall 
below acceptable levels, is difficult, and basing life expectancy on this factor is likewise 
flawed. The life expectancy of major system hardware components provides a reasonable 
figure for overall system life expectancy. With card technology systems, the major hard-
ware item used is the card reader or acceptor device. Since these card readers are 
mechanical devices, a life expectancy is a fairly easy to determine. Data on the mean time 
to failure (MTF) for the various card readers are available from both manufacturers and 
independent testing agencies. 
10. Cost Estimations 
As with any new technology to be acquired, cost plays an important role. In card 
systems, many items must go into a cost model. Card system acquisition is unique in 
many ways. Card systems do not have the large capital expenditures for hardware that are 
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associated with many other acquisitions. However, there are significant expenditures in 
card issuance, training both users and administrators, and in data collection. It is not this 
author's intent to review cost theory and analysis in this section, but rather to illustrate 
what research indicates are some of the major cost elements of card systems. 
Card systems are also not easily compared on a cost basis. Attempting to compare 
cost per unit of storage for example, would be futile. Integrated circuit cards (ICCs) have 
only 8 KB of data storage capacity, yet can cost several dollars each. In contrast to 
optical cards, which can have several MB of data storage and cost slightly less. Basing a 
decision on the cost per byte of storage criteria alone does not capture other capabilities of 
the card, such as the logic capability ofiCCs. Therefore, per byte storage, and many other 
conventional comparison schemes, are not meaningful measures. This further advances 
the need for an effective framework with which to compare card technology systems. 
In the illustrative cost analysis presented as part of the new framework in Chapter 
VI, eight cost categories are identified. The cost categories are acquisition and procure-
ment, hardware, software, data capture, operations, maintenance, training, and application 
specific costs. Each of these, along with some important cost considerations, will be 
briefly introduced in the paragraphs below. 
a. Reuse of Cu"ent Infrastructure 
A major factor in the cost of card technologies is the amount of reuse that will 
be possible in the migration path. This reuse is a consideration not only in terms ofthe 
amount of current infrastructure which will be reusable, but the amount of reuse possible 
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along the migration path. The migration path can be considered to have waypoints 
between the current and target systems. These waypoints are major milestones or major 
technological changes in the system. If a great deal of reusability is possible between these 
waypoints, overall life cycle costs will be reduced. Infrastructure reuse can come in the 
form of card readers, authentication devices, software, data, and the cards themselves. 
Backward compatibility is the term normally given to changes which allow reuse of cur-
rent system infrastructure. 
b. Cost Estimating 
Many of the cost estimations which will be made within the new framework, 
are future costs, in many cases distant future. Estimating cost becomes increasingly diffi-
cult and imprecise the further one moves away from the present. The cost estimation is 
further complicated by the fact that many of the costs being estimated are for technology 
which is not even available today. The future costs also involve estimations of future 
economic conditions and inflation. Cost estimation concepts are discussed further in 
Chapter V. 
c. Acquisition and Procurement 
Card technology systems have similar acquisition and procurement costs to 
most other acquisitions. The costs involved with requirements review and system design, 
as well as the competitive bid process must be taken into account in any cost estimations 
made. These cost should not present a particular challenge to the acquisition professional, 
because of their similar nature to other acquisitions. 
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d. Hardware and Software 
There are two major sources hardware cost for card technology applications, 
they are the cost of each individual card, and the cost of the hardware to read and interpret 
the card and identification measures. These are both a function of the number of each that 
will be in the system. Cards also have the potential ofbeing lost; so an estimation of the 
number of cards expected to be lost or damaged must also be made. Most hardware items 
are available commercially, and cost estimation should be relatively straight forward. 
Installation costs of the required hardware, along with any other supporting devices such 
as locks, gates, wiring, etc., must also be estimated. Data supplied by vendors, contrac-
tors, and other installations having systems installed, form a basis for initial cost 
estimations. As discussed under cost estimating above, future cost ofhardware are more 
difficult to estimate, and involve performing some economic as well as technological 
forecasting. An element of risk analysis is also involved in cost estimating, and this topic 
will be discussed further in risk analysis section ofthis chapter. 
Software costs include the cost ofthe application software running on the cen-
tral host computer, as well as any software required at the readers themselves. If logic 
capable cards are used, some software may be required for the card itself as well. Most of 
the required software should be available commercially, which would make the cost 
estimation relatively easy. However, it is more difficult to estimate the cost of software 
which must be developed or is not yet available commercially, but is expected to be 
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available in the future. Software cost estimation is a difficult task, and there have been 
numerous books, studies, and models published on this subject. 8 
e. Data Capture 
Most card systems require a substantial amount of data capture during imple-
mentation. Initial data capture can consume considerable amounts of both user and 
operator time. Some examples of required data capture include user information database 
initialization, and reference authentication or biometric data capture. The amount of time, 
both user and operator, is an often overlooked aspect of card system setup costs. 
f. Operations and Maintenance 
Operations and maintenance of card systems is similar to many other electronic 
systems. The costs to operate the system, including manning issues, need to be figured. 
Card systems generally do not have high maintenance and repair costs, however, expected 
maintenance and repair costs need to be incorporated into the cost estimations to capture 
the reliability differences between alternate migration options. 
g. Training 
Any time a new technology is adopted by an organization, training is required. 
This training needs to be not only for the operators of the system but for the users of the 
system as well. The amount oftime and effort required to conduct the training depends 
on several factors. The education level of the user, difficulty level of user operation, 
familiarity of operators with the this or similar technologies, difficulty level of operation, 
8 Boehm, Barry, Software Engineering Economics, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ, 1981. 
27 
and other similar factors should be taken into account when performing these estimations. 
Additionally, some training on the need and basis for the change may be appropriate to 
ensure the users are receptive to the change and accept the new technology. 
h. Application Specific Costs 
The category of application specific costs is provided as a convenient place to 
put any other anticipated application specific costs. What costs need to be considered in 
this category is dependent on the specific application the system is to be used for. An 
example would be the potential scrap value of components as system migration occurs. 
11. Risk Assessment 
The term risk assessment can take on several meanings depending upon the 
context in which it is used. Earlier, in the security section of this chapter, security risk 
assessment was discussed. Security risk assessment involves estimating the likelihood, or 
assessing the risk of, a security breach. In the cost estimation section, an economic risk 
assessment was made, in the form of estimating future costs, future economic conditions, 
and the likelihood of each. In this section, risk assessment refers to the assessment of 
technological risks. Many assumptions of the future state of card technologies will have 
to be made to develop the various migration paths toward a target system. Each of these 
paths will have a likelihood of occurrence and an amount of risk to project failure asso-
ciated with it. 
Some factors which should be considered when assessing the technological risks 
are the age of the technology, whether or not standards have been established, how great 
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the disparity between current technology and assumed technology is, and the desirability 
of assumed technology for example. 
12. Temporal Component 
With migratory system comparisons, different migration paths will produce differ-
ent functionality at different points in time. The value of this temporal component must be 
assessed in any meaningful comparisons of migration paths. Capturing this comparison is 
not easy. Within the new framework, this time preference is captured by a simple time 
preference weighting scheme. However, the weighting scheme is for all functionality, and 
not for each individual measure of performance. Weighting the time preference for each 
individual measure of performance is possible, however, it complicates the calculations 
considerably. The information gained from using this type of a time preference scheme 
would be marginal, and given the inaccuracies inherent in any estimation method, the 
result would provide little benefit. 
D. CONCLUSION 
There are many aspects of performance issues which need to be captured in any deci-
sion of card technology application. This chapter introduced many of these issues and 
some of the considerations which should go into making these decisions. This chapter 
also discussed how many of the steps within the new framework address these factors 
which must go into card technology selection. 
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Ill. CARD TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Before a framework for evolutionary migration can be presented, an understanding of 
the current state of card and card compatible technologies is required. This chapter 
provides background on the different card technologies currently being applied. For each 
different category of card technology, this chapter provides a short history, a system 
description, capabilities, limitations, and some common applications. Card technology is 
an extensive topic, with far more information about card technologies and their applica-
tions than is presented here. The user of this thesis need not be concerned with all the 
nuances of this technology, but rather needs a firm understanding of the base technologies 
and how they can be applied. This chapter provides the foundation needed to understand 
and apply a card technology selection methodology, however, it is not intended to be a 
exhaustive discussion of the topic. 
B. HISTORY OF CARD EVOLUTION 
The term card technology encompasses a wide assortment of different systems. The 
broad definition includes any technology that will fit on an industry standard card. The 
International Standards Organization (ISO) Standard 7810 defines the dimensions of an 
industry standard card to be 85.6 (± 0.12) millimeters (mm) by 53.98 (± 0.05) mm and 
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0.81 (± 0.01) mm thickY The card medium, although normally a plastic, can be card-
board, paper, pasteboard, or a variety of other materials.3 
Over 40 years ago, charge-a-plates became popular. These were metal plates which 
were issued by retailer-owned association for the purpose of extending credit to custom-
ers. The plates were embossed with the customer's name and account number.4 The 
evolution of cards, into the form we know them today, began in the 1960s with the inven-
tion of Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) and Polyvinyl Chloride Acetate (PVCA). The advent of 
this material made it possible to produce small, durable, flexible, embossed cards. PVC is 
still used in many card applications, however, it is not the only material in use. PVC is not 
recyclable and cannot be injection molded. Injection molding is the formation of a card by 
pouring (or injecting) a liquid material into a mold. PVC cards must be cut from sheets of 
PVC and machined to make the recess for the chip, costing considerably more. 5 Recent 
attention to environmental concerns and economic costs, cause PVC to be less and less 
desirable. There have been many advances in material sciences in recent years, including 
the invention of Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene (ABS), which, although not embossable, 
1 This is approximately 2.125" x 3.375" x 0.030" thick. 
2 With the exception ofPCMCIA cards which will be discussed in more depth later. 
3 Svigals, Jerome, Smart Cards: The new Bank Cards, MacMillan Publishing, NY, 
NY, 1987, p. 195. 
4 Linden, Larry F., "Introduction to Card Technology and Biometric Workshop," 
CardTech/SecurTech '93 Conference Proceedings, 1993, pp. 3-6. 
5 
"The Chip Card: A New Data Carrier Made of Plastic," Smart Card Technology 
International, 1994, p. 50. 
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is recyclable and can be injection molded. ABS is becoming the preferred medium for chip 
cards while PVC remains the preferred medium for magnetic stripe cards. 6 
The next major event in the evolution of card technologies, was the card stripe stan-
dard, set by the American National Standards Committee (ANSC) in 1973. This standard 
was the first step in wide spread standardization and acceptance of a card technology. It 
defined machine readability standards, physical characteristics, data density, location of 
embossing, magnetic recording techniques, and the like. In 1980, the VISA I Master Card 
consortium published the Bankcard Stripe mandate. This mandate required businesses to 
have the required magnetic stripe infrastructure by 1983, if they were going to accept 
VISA I Master Card. This mandate eventually led to widespread acceptance of magnetic 
stripe technology and the proliferation of magnetic stripe infrastructure. 7 
Integrated circuit card (ICC) history begins with the patents for ICCs, which were 
first granted in 1970. However, there were no large scale applications ofiCCs until 1985, 
when France Telecom selected smart cards over magnetic and holographic cards as the 
medium for payment on public telephones. 8 The French government sunk millions of 
francs into the development ofiCCs in the early 1980's. 9 This extensive use of smart 
6 GemPlus, Welcome to Smart Cards, draft copy, 1993, p. 21 and "The Chip Card ... ," 
1994, p. 50. 
7Linden, 1994, p. 6. 
8 GemPlus, 1993, p. 4. 
9
"Smart Card Draws a Blank," New Scientist, Vol. 99, No. 1371, August 18, 1983, 
p. 456. 
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cards by the French, in such a common application as public phones, lead to the rapid 
acceptance of smart cards in France and the rest of Europe. The patent for contactless 
ICCs was granted in 1973, only three years after the contact ICC patent. However, it suf-
fered from lack of application until the mid-1980s as well. Contactless technology has 
been employed extensively in radio frequency identification (RFIID) applications for many 
years. Radio frequency identification applications normally employ small electronic tags 
which are attached to items that are to be tracked. These tags respond with their identifi-
cation when interrogated by the system. Contactless ICCs are the transformation of this 
technology onto industry standard cards. 
The introduction of the optical card in the early 1980s was another major event in the 
evolution of card technologies. However, only recently has optical card technology 
evolved to the point of providing a viable technology at reasonable cost. Standards for 
optical cards are still being written by the International Standards Organization (ISO) and 
are expected to be finalized by 1995. As has been seen with other card technologies, 
completion of the standards should be a major boost for this technology. 
The latest evolution in card technologies is the Personal Computer Memory Card 
International Association (PCMCIA) issuance of the Personal Computer Memory Card 
Interface Adapter (PCMCIA) standards in the early 1990s. PCMCIA cards are thicker 
and more capable than other card technologies. The infrastructure proliferation for these 
cards has experienced an explosion since the issue of the standards, fueled largely by the 
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popularity of devices such as laser printers, notebook computer systems, palmtop comput-
ers, personal digital assistants, and the like. 
C. CARD TECHNOLOGIES 
This section describes each of the machine readable card technologies. Machine 
readable card technologies are loosely defined as any system which fits on the industry 
standard card and can "communicate" or be read by a computer or other reading device. 
1. Bar Codes 
a. History 
Bar coding did not start as a card technology and current major applications 
are not on cards. However, bar codes have been successfully used in a variety of card 
applications. Bar codes are machine readable, however, they do not truly "communicate" 
with a reader, rather they provide the reader with a single line of data of varying size, 
dependent on the type of bar code. The reader must store all the required data about the 
item in a central database. 
Bar codes were initially driven by retail applications and have been in extensive 
use since the Universal Product Code (UPC) was accepted as the industry standard on 
April 3, 1973. Although bar codes were originally developed for point of sale (POS) 
applications, they quickly spread to other uses, including industrial applications, and card 
technologies. 
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b. Systems Descriptions 
Bar codes are patterns of parallel bars and spaces of varying widths that repre-
sent characters. The spacing of the bars and spaces is called a symbology. These are 
many symbologies in use today, the more common ones are briefly discussed below. 
There are two major categories of bar code symbologies; discrete and 
continuous. Discrete symbologies allow the characters to stand alone and be decoded 
independently from other characters. The characters are separated by spaces. Continuous 
symbologies have no spaces between characters; the end of one character is the start of 
the next. Continuous codes with multiple element widths are the most common and most 
capable codes. These codes are referred to by their (n,k) designation, "n" being the width 
of the character (n modules) and "k" being the number ofbars and spaces. The total num-
ber of possible patterns in each element of a (n,k) symbology scheme is given by 
Equation (1)10 . 
(n- 1)! I [(2k- 1)! x (n- 2k)!] (1) 
For example, the standard UPC symbol is a (7,2) symbology, which allows a total of 20 
possible different patterns as shown in Equation (2). 
(7-1)! I [(2x2- 1)! x (7- 2x2)!] 
= 6! I (3! X 3!) 
= 720 I 36 
=20 
(2) 
10 Palmer, Roger C., The Bar Code Book: Reading, Printing, and Specification ofBar 
Code Symbols, 2nd ed., Helmers Publishing, Peterborough, NH, 1991, p. 19. 
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With 20 possible patterns in each of the 10 digits of the code, the total number of possible 
different UPC codes is 2010 = 10,240,000,000,000. The most capable bar codes can store 
up to 40 characters of data, with considerably more than 20 combinations per character, 
giving them an even greater number of possible combinations. 
Bar codes are read by a beam of light scanning the bar code. Dark bars absorb 
the light and spaces reflect the light back to the scanner. The scanner transforms the light 
reflections into electrical impulses which can be decoded into characters. Scanners can 
use a variety of light sources, including lasers, visual Light Emitting Diodes (LED), and 
infrared LED. Current technology allows scanners to read anywhere from direct contact 
to several feet away. 11 
(1) Code 39 Bar Codes. Code 39 was the first alphanumeric symbology 
developed and is still very popular in industrial and government applications. It is a 
discrete code, using two different widths ofbars (a two-width code). There are 44 char-
acters in code 39's character set, each consisting of five bars and four spaces, three of 
which are wide and six of which are narrow. Code 39 is also known as "3 of9 code", 
from the 3 wide bars of9 total bars. Code 39 can be used to encode the entire 128 char-
acter set by using two sets of nine bars and spaces to represent each character. Using this 
symbology, it is possible to produce codes of any practical length to meet varying needs. 
Code 93 is very similar to code 39, however, it is a continuous code (9,3) and is used to 
complement code 39. An example of a Code 39 bar code is given in Figure 2. 
11 Palmer, 1991, p. 70. 
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START ( 0 0 E STCJ' 
I 1111 Ill II \Ill I Ill II Ill II I 1111 
Figure 2 -- Code 39 Bar Code12 
(2) Code 128 Bar Codes. Code 128 was introduced in 1981 and is an alpha-
numeric symbology of 1 06 differe.nt characters. It uses blocks of three bars and three 
spaces, all of which fit into 11 modules (11,3). There are four element widths, and ele-
ments can be of from 1 to 4 modules wide. It also uses a check digit to perform a simple 
check sum on the code to ensure it was read correctly. Figure 3 is a sample of a code 128 
bar code. 
TER/11 NAT I CJl 
l\ Ill 111111 II II llllllllllllllll llf 
' 1 1 1 J. 1 1 1 1 1 1 J 
START A C 0 0 E ..-• I 2 8 ttt:O< STCP 
LYN..l£!F 84 
Figure 3 --Code 128 Bar Code13 
12 Palmer, 1991, p. 33. 
13 Palmer, 1991, p. 37. 
37 
(3) Universal Product Codes (UPC). As discussed earlier, UPC codes origi-
nated in the early 1970s. The most common form, Version A, is a fixed length code 
symbology, employing a 12 digit code. The first digit is a number system digit, indicating 
whether the item is a coupon, a product, an in-store marking, or other category. The next 
ten digits are broken up between the manufacturer (five digits) and the product (five dig-
its). The final digit is a check sum of the proceeding 11 digits. UPC symbology uses two 
spaces and two bars varying from one to four elements long for each symbol (7,2). 
Versions B, C and Dare not commonly used. Version E is used for small products and 
incorporates only 6 digits. Europe uses a superset ofUPC, known as the European 
Article Numbering (EAN) system. An EAN scanner can decode UPCs, but the inverse is 
not possible. 14 Figure 4 gives a illustration of a standard UPC. 
0 110 11050 5 
Figure 4 --Universal Product Code Bar Code 
( 4) Interleaved 2 of 5. Interleaved 2 of 5 is a self checking, continuous 
numeric symbology that is widely used in the distribution industry. Every character 
14 Palmer, 1991, p. 24. 
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encodes two digits, one in the bars and one in the spaces. This symbology consists of five 
bars and five spaces in each character, two of the bars and two of the spaces being wide 
and three of the bars and spaces being narrow. This sequence of bars and spaces provides 
100 unique symbols. It can be used in varying lengths and can incorporate check sums 
and the like. Figure 5 provides a sample of a interleaved 2 of 5 bar code. 
Figure 5 --Interleaved 2 of 5 Bar Code15 
(5) Code 49. Code 49 was introduced late in 1987 as a symbology for label-
ing small items. It consists of two to eight adjacent rows, separated by a one module bar. 
This symbology is a (16,4). Figure 6 provides a sample of code 49 bar coding. 
(6) Code 16K. Code 16K symbology is similar to Code 49, but 16 rows of 
symbols may be used. This symbology uses standard Code 128 (11,3) character patterns 
without individual row check characters, however, there are two overall check characters. 
Each row is 70 modules long and encodes five data characters. Since this symbology al-
lows a variable number of rows, a single character at the beginning is used to indicate total 
number of rows. 
15 Palmer, 1991, p. 27. 
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~-----~-----------------------------------
Figure 6 -- Code 49 Bar Codes16 
(7) Other Symbologies. The above mentioned symbologies are established 
industry standards and have well established vendor networks.
17 There are, however, 
countless other symbologies currently in use in specific applications. These include 
PDF417 (17,4), 2 ofS, Codabar, Codablock, Code 11, Plessey Code, Postnet, and a large 
number of even lesser known symbologies. While the reader need not be concerned with 
the variations of all of these, it is beneficial to know that there are many out there, one of 
which may be able to fill a specific requirement. 
c. Common Applications 
Bar codes are normally used in centralized database applications, where there 
is a need to quickly and accurately capture a high volume of items. Each item is assigned 
a unique bar code and the central database maintains all the data about the item. The most 
common applications for this technology is in retail stores at the point of sale (POS), li-
braries, inventory, and manufacturing tracking and control. When applied to card 
16 Palmer, 1991, p. 42. 
17 Palmer, 1991, p. 47. 
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technologies, it is used to record single lines ofnon-changing'data such as account num-
bers, name, social security number, etc., to allow rapid, error-free capture and recording 
of these data fields. 
d Capabilities 
Bar coding is an inexpensive technology that allows rapid capture of a fairly 
complex string of alphanumeric characters. Bar codes can be printed on adhesive strips 
using a laser printer and software, resulting in bar codes for fractions of a cent each. Bar 
code readers are also are inexpensive, typically less than $1 00 each. There are well estab-
lished standards and a wide variety of vendors. This relatively simple technology does not 
require advanced expert knowledge for installation or maintenance. 18 
e. Limitations 
The 40 character limit on data in a bar code does not support distributed data, 
rather it requires an extensive database to store all the required data about the codes. This 
normally requires a healthy investment in manual data entry somewhere in the process. 
Bar codes provide no security; they can be easily duplicated or counterfeited by anyone 
with bar code printing software. Bar codes cannot be modified, but must be reprinted to 
update. Additionally, they are easily damaged by scratching, rubbing, dirt, fog, and mist. 
18 lnformation Spectrum, Inc., brochure, February 16, 1994, pp. 23-24. 
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2. Magnetic Stripe Cards 
a. History 
Magnetic stripe technology began in the late 1960s. Magnetic stripe tech-
nology is the most widely used card technology currently on the market, with several bil-
lion cards of various forms in use today19 and about 1.3 billion cards being produced every 
year. 20 The majority of these are financial transaction card (FTC) applications, (more 
commonly known as credit cards) and Automatic Teller Machine (ATM) cards. 
Magnetic stripe cards began in response to a need for the automatic recording 
of account numbers. Embossed credit cards, with the account number and name in raised 
lettering on the card, flourished from 1950-1970. Because of this, the account numbers 
grew in length. These longer account numbers lead to difficulty in accurately recording 
them and a high error rate. Larger account numbers required automatic capture, hence the 
development ofmagnetic stripe cards. 21 
b. System Description 
Standard magnetic stripe cards have a single 0.5 inch wide, 0.0005 inch thick 
band of magnetic media that runs the entire length of the card. The media lies 0.223 
inches from one of the long edges of the card. These magnetic stripes are typically 
thought to be across the top back of the card, although the card may be printed with any 
19 Svigals, 1987, p. 21. 
20 Lavelle, Francis, "The Smart Card," Smart Card Technology International, 1994, 
p. 42. 
21 Svigals, 1987, pp. 20-38 
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orientation. All other area on the card is free for additional media, printing, raised letter-
ing, etc. 
The volatility of data stored on a magnetic stripe is dependent on the type of 
magnetic medium used. There are several magnetic media in use, which fall into two cate-
gories: High coercivity (Hi Co) and Low coercivity (LoCo). Coercivity is the amount of 
energy that is required to change the magnetic state of the material and is measured in 





) is the most common LoCo.23 The higher the coercivity of the material used for the 
magnetic stripe, the less chance there is for accidental erasure and altering. However, it is 
more difficult to initially record data on HiCo material, which results in increased cost of 
writing to the cards.24 
This magnetic medium is comprised ofthree tracks, each 0.110 inches wide. 
Track one has a recording density of 210 bit per inch (bpi) and can hold 79 alphanumeric 
characters and is normally used to hold data pertaining to the card holder. Track two is 
75 bpi and holds 40 numeric characters. It is designed to hold information for the automa-
tion of financial transactions, such as account number, expiration, type, etc. Track three is 
22 Dreifus, Henry, "Public Telephone Applications for Card Technologies; Practical 
Applications, Issues and Future Trends," CardTech '92 Conference Proceedings, 1992, 
pp. 3-6. 
23 Kutchera, Arthur, "High Coercivity Media," CardTech '92 Conference Proceedings, 
1992, p. 36. 
24 Mos, Robert, "High Coercivity Encoding," CardTech '92 Conference Proceedings, 
1992, p. 57. 
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again 21 0 bpi and can hold 107 numeric characters. This track is intended for information 
that will be updated with each transaction, such as balance.25 Many magnetic stripe card 
applications do not utilize all three tracks, even though all three are printed on the cards. 
Recently, cards have begun appearing with 0.33 inch magnetic strips, containing only two 
tracks, as the frequent updating of magnetic stripes is not common. 
To read from or write to a magnetic stripe card, the card must be moved under 
a recording or reading head. A recording head receives the encoded data (1 s and Os) and 
records it on the magnetic material by reversing the magnetic flux of the material in the 
magnetic stripe. A reading head detects flux reversals in the magnetic stripe, and a decod-
er translates these to data. Magnetic stripe cards are most commonly read by inserting the 
card into the reader or by passing the card through (called a swipe, from the hand motion 
of moving the card through the reader). Figure 7 provides a typical layout of a 
magnetic stripe card. 
c. Common Applications 
The dominant use of magnetic stripe technology continues to be financial trans-
action card (FTC) applications, such as credit cards, automatic teller machine (ATM) 
cards, and bank cards. Because of the inexpensive nature ofLoCo magnetic material, nar-
row, single tracks are frequently applied to disposable cards. These are used for fare 
collection in metro systems, amusement park rides, telephone calls, and the like. There 
25 Svigals, 1987, pp. 25-26. 
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are several other applications in place as well, from inventory tracking, to access control, 
to time and attendance accountability. 
Figure 7 -- Magnetic Stripe Card 
d. Capabilities 
Magnetic stripe card technology has been in use for over two decades. The 
standards are well established and the technology has significant vendor support. The 
infrastructure, at least for credit card applications, is in place throughout the world. Due 
to its popularity, standard magnetic s.tripe cards and Yeaders are inexpensive. This low 
cost, both of cards- (typically under $0.50 each) and of readers/writers (readers: about 
$25.00 each; writers: about $500.00 each),26 is magnetic stripe technology's major 
attraction. 
e. Limitations 
Magnetic stripe cards have many limitations. They provide little security. 
Magnetic stripes are easily read, altered, erased, copied, or counterfeited. LoCo cards 




are easily damaged or destroyed by demagnetizing. HiCo cards, while less easily dam-
aged, are still susceptible to demagnetization. They are also easily damaged by scratching, 
bending, dirt, etc. The life expectancy of a magnetic stripe card is only a few years, caus-
ing the need for reissue on a routine basis. 
Magnetic stripe cards are very limited in their data storage capacity of between 
150 and 475 characters. 27 In most applications, this limited data capacity requires the use 
of a central database to store other required data. They are not well suited for decentral-
ized database use. 
3. WIEGAND CARD TECHNOLOGY 
a. History 
Wiegand technology was introduced into the market in 1979. It was invented 
by John Wiegand, and the patents are held by Echlin Incorporated. When it was intro-
duced, it was the first completely new card technology to be placed on the market in over 
a decade. 28 There is a large installed base ofWiegand technology access control applica-
tions, due to its relatively low cost, high capability and 25 years of use. 
b. System Description 
Wiegand cards consist of from one to 56 wires laminated within the plastic of 
the card. Each of these wires can represent a bit of data, and can take on one of a number 
ofvalues. This allows an almost limitless combination of individual codes. The codes are 
27 lnformation Spectrum, Inc., 1994, p. 22. 
28 Mourey, Richard, "Wiegand Card Technology Remains A Secure Investment," 
Security Technology and Design, Vol. 4, No.6, August 1994, pp. 42-44. 
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produced by giving ferromagnetic wires unique magnetic properties. The wires are thin 
(0.10 inches) and are composed of two dissimilar materials, an outer shell and an inner 
core. The shell is heat treated and hardened, giving it set magnetic properties. The core is 
a soft material with changeable magnetic properties. When the wire is subject to a strong 
magnetic field, both core and shell have magnetic north at the same end, and the wire pos-
sesses its own magnetic field. If the wire is subjected to weaker magnetic fields oriented 
in the opposite direction, the core material may switch polarity, depending on the strength 
of the weaker field. If the core material does switch polarity, 1t causes the wire's external 
field to collapse. These collapsing and returning magnetic fields from the wire can be 
sensed by coils placed near the wires (i.e. in the reading device), and translated into dis-
crete analog electrical impulses. The pulses are crisp enough to be read as digital outputs. 
The electrical impulses are produced without using electrical input, requiring only relative 
motion between the wires and the magnetic fields of the reading device. 29 These systems 
normally use motion of the card through the reader to produce these electrical impulses, 
vice having the magnets in the reader move. 
c. Common Applications 
Wiegand technology's most common application is in access devices. The sys-
tems simplicity, durability and limited maintenance requirement make it well suited for 
access devices in hostile or remote applications. This technology has had little application 
outside this field. Although it is possible to use Wiegand card systems as an automated 
29 Mourey, 1994, pp. 43-44. 
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data capture device, similar to how magnetic stripe cards are often used, this is not a com-
mon application. Wiegand card systems cost more and have less data capacity than mag-
netic stripe cards. However, Wiegand cards provide greater security against duplication, 
security which is not warranted in most automated data capture applications. 
d Capabilities 
Wiegand technology cards provide significant advantage in card and reader life 
expectancy and durability. Since the cards contain only separate wires, there are no elec-
tronic circuits, soldered connections, or contact points to wear out or break. These wires 
are laminated within the card, providing protection from damage. The readers are like-
wise very durable, since there is no requirement for moving or electrical parts. 
The Wiegand cards themselves rank fairly well in security. They are difficult to 
copy, duplicate, or counterfeit. Tampering with the card destroys the wires and magnetic 
properties. However, these cards do not support any form of cryptography, biometrics, or 
any other advanced authentication schemes. The card faces are available for printing, pho-
tographic imaging or other visual authentication methods. This technology could be used 
with other technologies on a hybrid card. 
e. Limitations 
Wiegand cards are not able to be changed (or programmed) by system adminis-
trators in the field. They must be manufactured with their codes. This requires system 
designers to rely on the same vendor for all the cards which will be needed throughout the 
useful life of the card system. Wiegand systems also do not expand or change easily. Not 
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being able to program cards presents a significant inconvenience. The lack of ability to 
support user authentication security also limits their usefulness in advanced, automated 
access control systems. 
4. INTEGRA TED CffiCUIT CARDS 
a. Background 
Integrated Circuit Cards (ICCs) are available in a variety oftypes, each of 
which is described below. There are two major distinctions for ICCs: Whether they are 
contact or contactless cards; and whether they have a logic capability or are memory-only. 
These two major distinctions provide four of the categories ofiCCs described below. 
Super smart cards are an extension of contact smart cards, having an input/output (1/0) 
method. The final category, Personal Computer Memory Card Interface Adapter 
(PCMCIA) cards, are thicker than standard cards and may contain multiple integrated 
circuits (ICs). 
Much of the terminology that is used to describe these relatively new technolo-
gies is not firmly set yet -- especially the term "Smart Card'. The term smart card is often 
loosely applied to any card which has an integrated microchip. However, as already dis-
cussed, these fall into two categories; memory-only chip cards (that have no on-board pro-
cessor and therefore no logic ability) and micro-processor chip cards. 30 The former 
"cannot manipulate data and therefore do not deserve the attribute of smartness. "31 For 
30 Bass, Peter, "Cards in Communication," Smart Card Technology International, 1994, 
p. 32. 
31 Stanford, "What is a Smart Card," 1993, p. 117. 
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the purpose of this paper, the term ''programmable IC card'' will be reserved for logic 
capable (micro-processor chip) cards, whether contact or contactless. The term 
Integrated Circuit Card (ICC), in accordance with the International Standards Organiza-
tion (ISO), will be used for the broad category of all integrated circuit cards. The term 
"memory JC card" will be used for non-logic capable, memory-only ICCs. This is gener-
ally in accordance with industry norms, however, the reader may be exposed to other 
terms for ICCs, such as microcircuit cards (an International Association For Microcircuit 
Card's (INT AMIC) designation for ICCs), chip card (referring to the common name for 
ICs), and the term smart card applied loosely to all ICCs. Figure 8 provides the names 
commonly used for different technologies and the relationships between the technologies. 
The terms used in this paper are indicated by bold type; other names commonly encoun-
tered are italicized. 
The reader may also encounter IC chips in a variety of different media, such as 
in a plastic case in the shape of a kel2 or a dog tag (data tag). 33 These applications, al-
though not true card applications, resemble the ICCs in many ways. The contact points 
for the ICs are in a different place than on a card, but functionality is normally quite simi-
lar. Alternate types of media often provide a higher level of protection for the IC than a 
thin card does. These applications are far less common than ICC, because they do not 
32 Such as is used in STU-III telephone systems for example. 
33 Svigals, 1987, pp. 40-41. 
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conform to the current in-place infrastructure, the standards are not well defined, and 
therefore, they can only be used in their specific application. 
b. Evolution of the IC Card 
In the early 1970s, with the emergence of integrated circuit chips sufficiently 
small enough to fit on a card, smart cards were introduced by Motorola. 34 However, 
these cards did not gain popularity until the mid 1980s. The first large scale application of 
ICC cards was in 1985, when France Telecom selected smart cards over magnetic and 
holographic cards as the medium to use for payment on public telephones. 
35 Smart cards 
provided much greater security against fraud than the other card technologies. Smart card 
use for public phones followed in many other European and Asian countries. 
Around 1970, ICs became small and flexible enough to allow them to be 
placed on cards. Integrated circuits, microscopic electronic circuits etched onto semi-
conductor substrate, are more commonly known as "chips." These first chips were not 
capable enough to warrant the large scale investment required to develop ICC applica-
tions. With the advances made during the late 1970s in chip design, more and more capa-
ble ICCs began appearing. The early 1980s saw the first implementations in ICC systems. 
A Frenchman, Roland Moreno, is credited with inventing ICCs in 1974. However, Kuni-
takda Arimura, who is Japanese, obtained patents for contact ICCs in 1970, and 
34
''The Chip Card ... ," 1994, p. 50. 
35 GernPlus, 1993, p. 4. 
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contactless ICCs in 1974.36 Credit is generally given to the French for having been the 
first to implement ICCs on a large scale. In 1985, France Telecom decided to use ICC 
technology in its public phones. By 1992, over 60% ofFrance's public phones used smart 
cards. 37 
ICCs use an integrated circuit of 25 mm square. This size limitation standard 
was set after extensive testing demonstrated this to be the optimal size. It is the largest 
area which allows the flexibility required to have a reliable card. Using a chip larger than 
25 mm2 causes the ICC to have a high failure rate under to the expected stresses cards 
receive. Chips smaller than 25 mm2 severely degrade the capability of the IC and produce 
a marginal gain in reliability. 
As of early 1994, there had been 50 million integrated circuit chips supplied for 
smart card applications38 Although this is a far cry from the 1.3 billion magnetic stripe 
cards issued each year, it is predicted there will be an explosion of smart card applications 
in the corning years, with 575 million smart cards in use by 199639 and one billion in use by 
1998.40 
36 Won, Duk, J., "Introduction to Integrated Circuit (Smart) Cards," program 
management review paper, February 26, 1991, p. 4. 
37 GemPlus, 1993, p. 4. 
38 
"The Chip Card ... ," 1994, p. 50. 
39 Seidman, Stephan, "Advanced Card Technologies," CardTech/SecurTech '93 
Conference Proceedings, 1993, p. 24. 
40 GemPlus, 1993, p. 21. 
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c. Contact Chip Cards 
(1) System Description. Contact chip cards use a single IC (or chip) placed in 
a recessed area which has either been milled in or stamped on to the card. The chip has 
contact points which make point-to-point contact with the reader/writer device in order to 
communicate. Although chip configuration, design, and appearance vary among manufac-
turers, the contact points are always in the same place to ensure compatibility. The IC is 
powered, through the appropriate contacts, from an interfacing device, commonly known 
as card acceptor device (CAD), . Data and logic information likewise flow through a set 
of contact points. Figure 9 provides a typical layout of a contact chip card. 
Figure 9 -- Contact Chip Card 
(2) IC Programmable Cards. The programmable IC chip has logic capabilities, 
which allow it to carry out specific functions, respond to the external commands of the 
interfacing device, perform calculations, access memory, carry out a set of instructions, 
and make a host of other logic decisions and responses. 41 In order to carry out these 
41 Svigals, 1987, p. 39. 
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functions, these cards must be programmable, and therefore need an operating system 
(OS). There are two operating systems available for IC programmable cards, the chip op-
erating system (COS) and the multi-application chip operating system (MCOS), the latter 
providing more capability.42 These operating systems allow the IC to operate like a com-
puter on a card. The ICs for these cards operate on 8-bit microcontroller architecture. 
The clock speeds are determined by the power being supplied to the card's terminals from 
the interfacing device and are typically 3-5 MHz.43 
(a) Common Applications. Contact programmable IC cards are being used 
in an ever increasing array of applications. They are an extremely capable card techn-
ology, combining a logic ability with a memory space. Their potential applications are lim-
ited only by the imagination of the system designer. Some of the major categories of use 
are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Their use as a financial transaction card (FTC) is steadily increasing, 
especially as the price per card decreases and the infrastructure grows. While they have 
been slow to catch on in the United States, their use in Europe has blossomed, with the 
payment of public phone charges being a driving use. Credit card applications have been 
comfortable with the magnetic stripe technology, but with the vastly superior capabilities 
of the ·contact IC card and increasing security threats, that may change in the near future. 
42 Stanford, "What is a Smart Card," 1993, p. 124. 
43 Peyret, 1994, pp. 9-36. 
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-- --------- _______________________________ ___. 
Another expanding use for these cards is the electronic delivery of 
benefits such as food stamps, aid for families with dependent children, and other benefit 
payments. This is commonly called Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT). Because of the 
security capabilities and memory space, they can be initialized with a value, decremented 
as they are used, then "recharged" with value again when the person is eligible. Using a 
card technology in this fashion would provide significant savings in the printing, collec-
tion, administration, and destruction costs of the current paper system. Through the use 
ofbiometric identification,44 it would also provide a better guard against fraud (multiple 
claims by the same individual) in the system. Many states and the federal government are 
looking into this technology as the future for EBT.45 
Access control is another rapidly expanding use for contact IC cards. 
They can be used for access to buildings, secure areas within buildings, computer systems, 
parking lots, or any other area. The logic ability and memory space combination allows 
the use of biometric identification. This provides sophisticated identification measures and 
significant security capabilities with unattended systems (limited human intervention) and 
without the use of a secure central database. 
(b) Capabilities. The major advantage of programmable IC cards is their 
flexibility to adapt to a number of different applications. Even the diverse set of 
44 Biometric identification will be discussed further in Chapter IV. 
45 Department of Treasury, Financial Management Service, "Electric Benefit Transfer: 
Progress, Plans, Perspectives and People, EBT Status Report, August 1992, and Direct 
Payment Card: Midpoint Evaluation, March 31, 1993. 
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applications above can all be programmed into a single card. Programmable IC cards can 
be designed with secure operating systems and data integrity measures to make tamper-
ing, duplication, and modification extremely difficult. These cards are capable of full 
blown encryption algorithms, (such as RSA or DES described in the authentication sec-
tion) at speeds greater than human response time. 46 This allows the positive identification 
and validation of the card/user to take place unattended and without the use of a central 
database.47 With the exception of the OSs, the standards for contact IC programmable 
cards are well established. 
(c) Limitations. Contact IC programmable cards are more expensive than 
other types of cards discussed thus far. Most IC programmable card applications utilize 
cards with 1-2 kilo-bytes (KB) ofEPROM or EEPROM memory. 48 These cards cost 
about $10.00 each. Currently, IC programmable cards are available with a maximum of8 
KB of memory and cost around $20.00 per card. The CADs for these cards cost between 
$200 and $800 each depending on the capability required. 49 
46 0ndrusch, 1994, pp. 61-68. 
47 Nelson, R.A., "Authentication Techniques For Smart Cards," CardTech/SecurTech 
'94 Conference Proceedings, 1994, p. 47. 
48 A complete discussion of memory types is included in Appendix B. 
49 Seidman, Stephan, "The State of Smart Card Technology," CardTech/SecurTech '94 
Conference Proceedings, 1994, p. 208. 
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____________________________________ ____. 
While initial indications are that ICCs are more durable than magnetic 
stripe cards, they still have a limited life. The life expectancy is a function of the number 
of read/write cycles the card is subject to, because the physical contact of the cards 
terminals with the CAD eventually wears out these terminals. Like most other card 
technologies, programmable IC cards are subject to damage from chemicals, bending, flex-
ing, scratches, heat, and demagnetization. The exposed contact points are also a source of 
potential damage. 
(3) Memory IC Cards. Another major category of contact IC cards is memory 
IC cards. Contact memory-only IC cards have the same outward appearance as contact 
programmable IC cards, but have no or very limited logic capabilities. They instead use 
the entire chip area for memory space. Their physical operation and interface with the 
CAD is the same as a programmable card, with the exception of the operating system. On 
a memory-only card, the CAD performs the functions carried out by the OS in a program-
mabie card. These CADs are sometimes referred to as smart readers. 5° 
(a) Common Applications. A major application of memory IC cards is the 
storing of data that does not require sophisticated security schemes. An example of this 
would be the storing of employee time and attendance records or medical information. 
These cards can be used in a distributed data environment, allowing all the required data 
to be stores on the card itself vice in a central database as we have seen with other 
technologies. 
50 Seidman, Stephan, "Advanced Card Technologies," CardTech/SecurTech '93 
Conference Proceedings, 1993, p. 21. 
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(b) Capabilities. Since memory IC cards use the entire chip for memory, 
they have several times the memory capacity of programmable IC cards. These cards are 
currently limited to 64 KB of memory, which is about 16 pages of text or eight times the 
amount of memory available on programmable ICCs. This vastly expanded memory 
capability gives these cards an entirely different set of capabilities. Memory-only IC card 
abilities are similar to the newer optical memory cards, however, optical memory cards 
have a larger data storage capacity. 
(c) Limitations. The cost of memory IC cards, while Jess than program-
mable IC cards, is still greater than the other technolog\es discussed thus far. Durability 
limitations oflC roen:N)ry-onJy cards 1s the same as IC programmable cards. While distrib-
uted data has its advantages, the distribution of data on cards is not flawless, since cards, 
and the data contained on them, can be easily lost or damaged. There must be elaborate 
backup schemes used with memory-only cards or the data lost w111 be difficult to regener-
ate. Memory-only cards provide 1es...~ security than their programmable counter parts, and 
are inappropriate for use in applications requiring a high level of security. 
( 4) Super Smart Cards. A relatively new addition to the chip card arena is 
what is being termed a super smart card. This card contains a standard contact-type logic 
capable IC, a key pad, and a small display. They operate similar to standard program-
mable IC cards, with the exception of allowing input and output to occur directly on the 
card without the use of the CAD. These cards have not found mass appeal yet and are the 
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least developed of all chip card products. 51 Figure 10 provides the layout of a typical 
super smart card. 
DISPLAY 
CSH i@ 1 2 3 X + 
ENT 4 5 6 I -
no 7 8 9 0 yes 
Figure 10 --Super Smart Card 
(a) Common Applications. Currently there are few common applications 
for this card technology. With the growing use of smart cards, this type of card may find 
favor in the niche of personal transactions between individuals, especially since CADs for 
this type of card would be relatively inexpensive. 
(b) Capabilities. Super smart cards have the same abilities as standard pro-
grammable IC cards with the addition of allowing input and output (I/0) directly on the 
card. There seems to be little advantage to this technology, although some argue that it 
provides the card user with the assurance that their PIN is not being captured by the terrni-
nal and falsified values are not being written to the card without the users knowledge. 52 
51 Seidman, "The State of Smart Card Technology," 1994, pp. 205-213. 
52 Stanford, "What is a Smart Card," 1993, pp. 120-121. 
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(c) Limitations. These cards are prohibitively expensive, costing in excess 
of $20 each. The same durability issues associated with other contact IC cards are present 
with super smart cards and, in addition, the durability of the display and key pad have yet 
to be proven. The super smart card provides another level of sophistication and the reli-
ability of this card is lower than other IC cards. 
d Contactless Chip Cards 
(1) System Description. Contactless chip cards communicate with a 
reader/writer, commonly referred to as a Card Coupling Device (CCD), through the use of 
an electromagnetic (EM) wave. Unlike contact cards they do not require contact termi-
nals. Contactless cards, since they must possess the ability to transmit to the CCD, must 
have a power source. There are two options for this power source, building it into the 
card or delivering it to the card from an external source. Batteries are used for built in 
power supplies, and batteries thin enough to fit in the ISO standard 0.82 mm card are 
available. Battery life varies with usage, temperature, and other factors, and is limited. 
These batteries must be replaced every few years. 53 These cards are also commonly 
referred to as active contactless cards. The delivering of power to the card from an exter-
nal source is known as inductive powering. Power is delivered in the form of an EM 
wave. There are several limitations involved with this choice of powering. First, the pow-
er cannot be transmitted over great distances efficiently. Second, the orientation of the 
53 Stanford, C.J., "Contactless Cards: An Overview," CardTech/SecurTech '93 
Conference Proceedings, 1993, p. 86. 
61 
card to the CCD is more restrictive, usually ± 45 degrees. Third, radio frequency (RF) 
regulations may prevent the cards use in some areas. 54 These cards are referred to as 
passive contactless cards. 
The distances that contactless card systems operate at vary from fractions 
of an inch to several feet. The shortest distance systems require the user to insert the card 
into a CCD, although the card does not make point to point contact with the CCD. These 
applications are referred to as a slot operation system. Another term the reader may 
encounter in the description of contactless systems is proximity cards or proximity badges. 
Proximity cards are contactless cards that operate at greater distances than slot operation 
cards, typically in the several inch range. Figure 11 provides a typical layout of a the card. 
The reader is reminded that these components normally lie between the plastic layers of 
the card, and may not be visible on the exterior of the card. 
(2) IC Programmable Cards. Contactless IC programmable cards operate in 
much the same way that contact IC programmable cards work, with the exception of the 
physical contact points. The ICs in these cards have the same abilities as the ICs in 
contact cards. However, the applications, capabilities, and limitations of these cards are 
significantly different. 
(a) Common Applications. Contactless programmable IC cards are exten-
sively used in access control systems. Since these cards have the same functionality as 
contact programmable IC cards, the access control discussion also applies to these cards. 
54 Ibid. 
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Figure 11 -- Contactless IC Card, Interior View 
There is a significant amount of work being performed with these cards for 
the automated collection of tolls and traffic management. The collection of tolls uses a 
prepaid system which is then decremented as the driver passes through toll booths. The 
contactless card allows the driver to pass through the toll booth without stopping. 
(b) Capabilities. A significant advantage of contactless cards is there is no 
contact between the CCD and the card, and therefore no contact points to wear out. 
Since no contact points are required, the entire IC and associated wiring can be well 
protected within the layers of plastic laminate. These two factors make contactless cards 
generally more durable than contact cards. 55 
Since there is no need for direct contact with these cards, their use and 
application is more flexible, as seen with the toll booth example above. The battery oper-
ated cards provide more flexibility than cards which are powered by the CCD, because 
they do not require a certain orientation between the CCD and the card. 
55 Honold, Fred, "The Advantages of Contactless Cards," Smart Card Technology 
International, 1994, pp. 36-37. 
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---------------------------------------------------------------~ 
(c) Limitations. The higher cost discussion of contact programmable IC 
cards is applicable here as well, with these cards costing slightly more than their contact 
brethren. While more durable than contact IC cards, contactless cards are still susceptible 
to damage from heat, flexing, demagnetization, chemicals, and the like. Contactless cards 
have a limited range, and this range is adversely affected by electro-magnetic interference 
(EMI). These cards cannot be used in areas where line of sight with the CCD is not possi-
ble or in areas with high EMI. 
For battery operated cards, the limiting factor is battery life. With cur-
rent technology, battery life on these cards is limited to a few years of intermittent use. 
The battery is normally not rechargeable nor replaceable, therefore these cards must be 
replaced at certain intervals. 56 
(3) IC Memory Cards. These cards can be thought of as an advanced form of 
bar codes, to be used where the optical scanning of an identification tag is impossible or 
inappropriate. 57 These cards provide a fairly large storage area, up to about 64 KB, and 
with the exception of the requirement for physical contact with the CCD, are very similar 
in operation to the contact memory-only cards. Contactless IC memory cards are one 
form of proximity cards. Although other proprietary technologies have been used in prox-
imity cards in the past, the contactless IC memory card is the most common form today. 
These cards are also similar in operation to the RF liD tags discussed in the opening 
56 Pemberton, James, "Contactless Cards -- The Solution to All the Problems?", Smart 
Card Technology International, 1994, p. 85. 
57 Stanford, "Contactless Cards: An Overview," 1993, p. 84. 
64 
paragraphs ofthe chapter. These cards can be attached to containers, vehicles, inventory, 
or other items to provide automated tracking. 
(a) Common Applications. Contactless memory-only IC cards major appli-
cation is in tracking objects. These cards can respond with set codes when interrogated by 
a CCD. They can also store data when accessed by a CCD. The most common applica-
tions are in vehicle identification tags and toll collection. In contrast to programmable 
cards used for toll collection, memory-only cards only provide the CCD with an identifica-
tion, the CCD then accesses the user's record in a central database and adds the 
appropriate toll charges to it. Billing is then done from this central database. Other appli-
cations are currently being investigated as well, such as scale bypass cards for trucks 
which have already been weighed. 58 
(b) Capabilities. These cards have the same capabilities as the contact 
memory-only cards. They also have the advantage of not requiring direct contact as dis-
cussed under contact programmable IC card capabilities. 
(c) Limitations. As discussed under contact memory-only cards, these 
cards have no logic capability for security. The discussion of battery life, distance, and 
EMI limitations under the programmable contactless IC card is applicable here as well. 
58 Department of Transportation, Nontechnical Constraints and Barriers to 




(1) System Description. Personal Computer Memory Card Interface Adapter 
(PCMCIA) cards can be classified as a type ofiCC, however, they only loosely resemble 
ICC cards. They are considerably thicker (from 3.3 mm to 10.5 mm vice 0.82 mm) and 
are have a hard plastic shell protecting the internal components. Because of this plastic 
shell, these cards do not under go the flexing and stresses that thin cards do, so they are 
not limited to single ICs per card, nor are they limited to 25 mm2 square ICs. With multi-
ple, larger ICs, it is possible to incorporate more functionality and memory into a single 
card. In addition, these cards uses two parallel 34-pin sets to form a sophisticated 68-pin 
interface (versus the simple contact points of other contact chip cards) to communicate 
with the CAD. The combination of these abilities gives the PCMCIA card far more capa-
bility than standard thin cards. These cards are currently available in up to 80 MB 
memory configurations, providing a type of hard drive ability for palmtop computers, 
printers, notebook computers, personal digital assistants and other small devices. 
PCMCIA cards are also available to carry out interface functions such as fax/modems and 
network communications. These cards can also be loaded with software applications for 
execution on these small devices. 
There are currently three standard sizes for PCMCIA cards. All are the 
ISO standard height of85.6 mm and width of 53.98 mm, but vary in thickness. Type I is 
3.3 mm thick, Type II is 5 mm thick and Type III is 10.5 mm thick. Because the 68-pin 
interface is common to all types, each type is backward compatible with the previous 
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type(s). This means a Type II can accept a Type I card, and a Type III can accept Type I 
or Type II cards. 
(2) Common Applications. The most common applications for PCMCIA 
cards are in the small computing environment where a 3 1/2 inch drive is impractical. As 
the use of these products rapidly expands, so is the number and types ofPCMCIA cards 
being offered. They have yet to penetrate the common thin applications, due mostly to 
their high cost and capability beyond what thin card systems developers currently know 
how to apply. As their price decreases, the infrastructure of CADs grows, and the need 
for more ability increases, these cards are certainly poised to provide the capabilities 
required. 
(3) Capabilities. With well protected, multiple, large ICs, and a able interface, 
these cards can provide significant capabilities. With the current state of micro-circuitry, 
almost any application is possible within these cards. Standards are well defined for these 
cards and compatibility between devices is not a significant problem. 
(4) Limitations. The most significant limitation ofPCMCIA cards is their high 
cost. The relatively small, 2 MB PCMCIA cards are around $100 each, and more capable 
64MB cards are over $500.59 Specific application cards such as fax modems are also in 
the hundreds of dollars. 
Like other contact cards, PCMCIA cards make physical contact with the 
CAD, and although the 68 pin connector is very durable, it can wear out or be damaged. 
59 Haddock, 1993, p. 389. 
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A contactless PCMCIA card has yet to be produced. The thickness ofPCMCIA cards 
make the carrying of them not as practical as thin card technologies that fit conveniently 
with existing credit cards and ATM cards of the same size. 
A concern in the security arena is that intra-IC communications must be 
encrypted or be subject to possible interception and duplication. With the larger ICs, it 
would be possible to conduct encrypted intra-IC communications, however, there would 
be some degradation in speed. 
5. OPTICAL MEMORY CARDS 
a. History 
The use of optical media as a storage device began in the late 1970s. The first 
large scale uses of this technology were in videodiscs and compact discs (CDs). The vid-
eodiscs were not well received by the public for two reasons; consumers insisted on being 
able to record their own material, and there were good substitutes available at lower cost 
(video tapes). However, the infrastructure of CD players quickly spread during the 1980s, 
due to the higher quality and relatively low cost of these machines.60 This wide spread 
commercial use of optical media lead to advanced research in this area. The first wide-
spread use of optical media to record data occurred in the late 1970s. Optical memory 
cards (OMCs), were introduced in 1981. These cards are also commonly referred to as 
Laser Optical Memory Cards (LOMCs). 
60 Bitter, Gary G., (ed.), Macmillan Encyclopedia of Computers, Macmillan, NY, Vol. 
2, 1992,pp. 955-960. 
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b. System Description 
OMCs use the standard plastic card, and cover the surface with a thin layer of 
optical media similar to the surface of a CD. The optical layer is covered by a transparent 
layer of poly carbonate, providing protection for the optical layer. The storage of data on 
these cards occurs by placing microscopic pits, or "spots", on parallel tracks of the optical 
layer. The presence or absence of these spots indicate the binary "1 s" or "Os", and can 
than be read as data by a laser beam. 61 OMCs use what is known as write once, read many 
(WORM) technology. This means once the optical media has been written to, it cannot be 
changed. Figure 12 provides a typical layout of an OMC .. 
Figure 12 - Optical Memory Card 
c. Common Applications 
The most common application for OMCs is in the storing of medical informa-
tion. The high data capacity lends itself well to this application, for medical records tend 
to be lengthy, especially when they include items like x-ray images, cat scans, ultrasounds, 
61 Stanford, "What is a Smart Card," 1993, p. 120. 
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or other imaging technologies. These cards can be used anywhere there is a need for por-
tability of large document storage. They are being applied to library systems, inventory 
management and control, and even pay telephone systems. 
d Capabilities 
OMCs have the highest data capacity of any card technology currently on the 
market, with 2-16 MB of storage. The amount of storage available on the card is a func-
tion of the size of the data spots. Current laser and optical media technology uses spots as 
small as 2.25 micros, allowing 16MB of storage. OMCs are also the most durable of the 
current card technologies. They are unaffected by magnetization, heat and cold (-40 to 
212 degrees), EMI, flexing, and weather. They are still damaged by scratching, but data 
which is not directly where the scratch is can be recovered, making them the most resilient 
of the card technologies. 
Although the cards are not updatable, with the vast storage ability of OMCs, 
new data can be written to a different area on the card. This is know as directly read after 
writing (DRAW). When new data is entered on the card, a pointer to this data is updated 
to reflect the location ofthe most up-to-date information, but the old information cannot 
be erased. This provides a audit trail of all previous information, which can easily be 
reconstructed. The use ofDRAW-type cards provides the user and the application with 
the appearance ofupdatability. 
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e. Limitations 
OMC costs are comparable with the ICC costs, at around $4.00 each with 2-4 
MB of storage. The readers/writers are considerably more expensive, currently costing 
several thousand dollars, however read only units are available for hundreds of dollars. 
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Security is an issue with these cards. The audit trail provides an excellent 
source of validating the authenticity of the card, and the vast storage area allows the stor-
ing ofbiometric identification data. The duplication of these cards is relatively simple, 
however, the updating of data, especially encrypted data is not easy. 
The standards for OMCs have only recently been completed. As OMC 
technology is still in its infancy, the infrastructure and vendor support is not yet well estab-
lished. As this capable technology matures, these will also. 
6. HYBRID TECHNOLOGY 
a. History 
For most of the above technologies, there are standards which state the exact 
locations of the media, embossing, contact points, etc. The only exception is bar codes, 
which are normally read by a hand scanner or a fixed scanner which the cards are passed 
over, thus eliminating the need for the bar code to be at an exact location on the card. 
Most of these standards, by not indicating the same placement for the technologies, allow 
62 Capaldi, Lucy, "The Defense Logistics Agency Automated Manifest System: A 
Status Report," CardTech!SecurTech '94 Conference Proceedings, 1994, p. 299, and 
Stanford, "What is a Smart Card," 1993, p. 121. 
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multiple technologies placed on a single card to still conform to standards. Currently, the 
most common hybrid cards are bar codes and/or magnetic stripes placed with an I C. 
b. System Description 
It would be fruitless to attempt to describe all the systems which are possible 
using hybrid technology. The operation ofthese cards, with the exception of possible 
interfaces between the various technologies, would be similar to the individual systems 
alone. The possible interfaces between different technologies is yet to be seen. A card 
that is possible using hybrid technology is provided in Figure 13. 
Figure 13 -- Hybrid Technology Card - Front And Back 
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c. Common Applications 
Hybrid technology is still in its infancy. With the endless possible combinations 
of technology comes an endless array of possible uses, constrained only by the imagination 
of the systems developer. The lack of a standard specifically for hybrid technology may 
hinder some of the more creative applications, especially where the various technologies 
need to interact to produce the most efficient use of the limited card space. 
d Capabilities 
The capabilities of the various combinations would be at least the sum of the 
capabilities of the individual technologies. Combinations where the technologies interface, 
such as a combination of a programmable IC with an optical storage space, could provide 
a greater advantage then the technologies alone. 
With a hybrid card, it is possible to have an independent backup systems to 
exist on the same card, thus reducing the chance of failure. Hybrid cards also allow multi-
ple applications to exist on a single card and allow them to use the most appropriate media 
choice for that application. 
e. Limitations 
The lack of standards for multiple technologies is a severe limitation. Cur-
rently each individual technology has its set of standards, but there are not standards 
addressing the interoperability of multiple technologies on a single card. This forces each 
technology to act independently, or the CAD to act as the coordinating mechanism. The 
international standards bodies will surly address this in future standards. 
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Cost is another limitation ofthis technology. Cards will always be subject to 
loss, damage, theft, etc., and the cost of cards with multiple sophisticated technologies on 
them will be significant. There can be significant amount of data stored on these cards as 
well, and if not constantly backed up, recreation oflost data could be costly. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented a discussion of current card technologies. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the key elements of these technologies. The recent increased rate of techno-
logical change, ever increasing array of card technologies available to choose from, and 
evolutionary nature ofthese card technologies makes choosing the most appropriate sys-
tem difficult. The framework presented in Chapter VI will aid the decision maker in pro-
curing the most cost effective solution for the application. 
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TABLE 1- SUMMARY OF CARD TECHNOLOGIES63 
Technology Memory Card Card Costs CAD Logic 
Capacity Security Costs Capability 
Bar Codes 32 bytes low $0.03- $100 no 
(40 char) 0.08 
Magnetic Stripe 320 bytes low $0.08- $25- no 
(475 char) 0.30 500* 
Wiegand 56 bits medium $0.50-2 $20 no 
ICC: Contact Programmable 8KB high $2.50- 5 $200- yes 
800* 
Contact Memory 164KB Jimjted $0.50-2 $20- no 
400* 
Contactless Programmable 8KB high f~B.SO- 6 $300- yes 
1000* 
Contactless Memory 64KB limited $1 - 2 $30- no 
500* 
Super Smart 8KB high $20+ $150- yes 
900* 
PCMCIA 80MB very high $100+ $30- yes 
$1000# 
Optical Memory 16MB limited $2- 10 $400- no 
3000* 
Hybrid- up to can be $2-20 $1000s can be 
depends on combination used 16MB high 
* depending if read only or read/write 
# depending if embedded or stand alone 
63 Compiled form a variety of sources. 
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IV. AUTHENTICATION TECHNIQUES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Although card technologies can be used as stand alone systems, they provide little 
security in this configuration. For a card system to provide security, there must be some 
manner of ensuring the person who is currently possessing the card is the person who is 
authorized to use the card. The system must also validate that the card being presented 
has not been altered. To accomplish this, card systems are frequently used in conjunction 
with some form of identification or authentication ofthe person using the card and ofthe 
card itself. This chapter discusses the common authentication techniques for cards and for 
individuals, by mechanical and human means. 
A major benefit card systems can provide is automation capability, the ability to reduce 
the human intervention required. Therefore, the discussion of authentication accomplished 
by human intervention is brief and provided only for completeness. Automated authenti-
cation techniques such as biometric, behavioral, and others provide a more capable system 
and are discussed in depth. The identification of the cards is accomplished by a variety of 
proprietary means, the more capable the card is, the more sophisticated the identification 
scheme can be. 
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B. BACKGROUND 
The authentication process is generally considered to consist of one or more of the 
three types of identification methods. The three types of identification methods are: 
1. What the user possesses 
2. What the user knows 
3. Who the user is1 
What the user possesses, refers to some form of token, be it a license, a badge, a card, 
a ticket, or any other form of token. While this token can take many shapes, this paper 
only discusses tokens in the form of card technologies. Tokens can be forged, so they 
must be authenticated. Token authentication for the more advanced card technologies, 
(cards with logic capability or large data storage areas) can be very sophisticated. A dis-
cussion of these authentication schemes is beyond the scope of this paper and will not be 
presented. However, a brief overview of some card authentication schemes for less capa-
ble cards has been included. These include technologies such as electronically verifiable 
holograms, magnetic ink, and optical character recognition. Authentication systems which 
use only this first identification method are relatively insecure, allowing access to anyone 
who possesses the right token. 
What the user knows, refers to some form of password. Again, these can take many 
shapes, from static character strings and personal identification numbers (PINs) to chal-
lenge and response systems. The more dynamic the password is, the more security it 
1 Muir, Barbara, 11 Authentication Considerations For External User Access, 11 
CardTech/SecurTech '93 Conference Proceedings, 1993, p. 900. 
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provides. Systems using only what the user knows likewise provide limited security, 
allowing access to anyone possessing the right knowledge. 
Who the user is, refers to some form of positively identifying the individual. These 
systems can take one of two forms, behavioral and physiological. Behavioral characteris-
tics are features that result from how an individual performs some function, such as 
signing their name or typing a string of characters. Physiological features are biological 
features about the person that distinguished them from others. These include features 
such as fingerprints, hand geometry, eye retinal pattern, hand vein patterns, or facial 
geometry. 2 Voice recognition systems fall into both categories, since it includes both 
behavioral aspects (accent) and physiological features (vocal cord shape). 3 For the pur-
pose of this paper, and in compliance with industry norms,4 voice recognition systems will 
be considered a behavioral attribute. 
Figure 14 provides a graphical view of the three different authentication methods and 
some of their enabling technologies. While understanding of these three authentication 
methods by themselves is essential, their true capability is achieved when used in 
2 Holmes, James, P., "Promising Developments and Biometric Testing," CardTech/ 
SecurTech '93 Conference Proceedings, 1993, p. 317 and Carter, Bob, "The Present and 
Future State ofBiometric Technology, CardTech/SecurTech '94 Conference Proceedings, 
1994, pp. 402-405. 
3 Alexandre, Thomas and Vincent Cordonnier, "An Object-Oriented Approach for 
Implementing Biometrics in Smartcards," CardTech/SecurTech '94 Conference 
Proceedings, 1994, p. 150. 
4 Revillet, Marie and Mohammed Achemlal, "Biometric Authentication Principals, Use 
and Limitations," CardTech/SecurTech '94 Conference Proceedings, 1994, p. 161. 
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combination. There are seven possible combinations which use one or more technology, 
they are: The three methods alone; the three combinations using two methods; and the 
use of all three methods together. The most common systems are a combination of two 
technologies, and include such familiar applications as ATM machines (which use a card 
and a PIN), and access devices (using a card and a biometric authentication). Adding a 
second authentication method does not necessarily increase the security of the system, as 
in the case of a card and static PIN, an impostor can be in possession of both. Combining 
biometric authentication with a token makes the identification of the individual easier (in 
terms of speed, processing requirements, data storage, etc.) by changing the problem from 
one of identification to one of authentication. 
A discussion of identification and authentication is useful here. Identification and au-
thentication are actually two different concepts, although the terms are often used inter-
changeably. In an identification system (also sometimes called recognition systems), the 
attribute is entered without any information about the individual. The system attempts to 
match the attribute in its large database of stored attribute-identity combinations. These 
systems are commonly used by law enforcement officials to identify criminals. These sys-
tems are large, costly, and have a higher computational ability than authentication systems. 
An authentication (also referred to as verification) of a person is the verification of the 
identity they claim to have. These systems use some form of identification (such as a card, 
access name, or other identity claim), and an identifier (such as a password, personal 
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identification number, or physical characteristic). If the identifier matches the reference 
stored in the system's database, authentication is positive and access is granted. 5 
To complete an authentication, there must be a means of comparing the person cur-
rently being presented to the "actual" or reference data about the person issued the card. 
Actual or reference data is normally captured at time of enrollment in the system. This 
comparison can be accomplished in one oftwo ways. In a distributed system, the refer-
ence data is stored directly on the card. This data must be protected in some way, such as 
by using one of the data encryption techniques discussed in Chapter II. The data must 
either be protected from replacement, by using unalterable data areas for example, or the 
system must be able to detect replacement, such as by audit trail use. In a non-distributed 
environment the reference data is stored in a central data base. When an authentication 
request is received, the system compares the current data to stored data and determines if 
the authentication ofthe person is valid. A similar system can be used to implement 
multiple access levels into a single system. After the authentication of the individual, the 
system could then authenticate the individual's access to an area, system, or procedure. 
The access authentication can be distributed or not, just as the reference data is. A hybrid 
data storage scheme, where the authentication information is contained on the card and 
access information is stored in a central database, is also possible. This is a common con-
figuration when a single card is to be used to access multiple systems. 
5 Revillet, 1994, pp. 159-160. 
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C. AUTHENTICATION BY HUMAN INTERVENTION (MANUAL) 
1. Authentication of the Individual 
People often use visual cues for authentication techniques. This use of visual 
authentication has been in use since the beginning of time. Cave men were able to distin-
guish fellow humans from animals and would act accordingly. Humans are very good at 
recognizing individuals they know and their ability for pattern recognition is unmatched by 
any automated process. However, humans are not as good at tasks that require long 
hours of attention to a mundane chore. 6 To have a human controlled system that is avail-
able 24 hours a day, 365 days a year requires a great deal of human capital. The cost of 
human capital, demand for constant system availability, and poor performance ofhumans 
at mundane chores are major factors that have driven the use of automated authentication. 
The most common forms of identification by human intervention are discussed below. 
a. Photograph 
Attaching a photograph to a card technology and verifying the person's visual 
appearance each time they use the card provides a low level of security. There are many 
negative aspects to this type of authentication. People change their appearance over time, 
including changing hair length and style, facial hair, glasses, etc. Depending on the reissue 
frequency of the card, they may not closely resemble their picture at all. This degrades the 
ability of the person checking the card to properly perform their function. In addition, 
some humans have an exact twin, and it may be difficult to distinguish them based on 
6 Holmes, 1993, p. 318. 
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outward appearance alone. Pictures are also relatively easy to alter or remove and 
replace. There are many new technologies being developed which strive to minimize this, 
including holographic images, or seals added directly into tl\e laminating material of the 
card. While these provide some security against altering, they are again limited by the abi-
lities of the person who checks them. 
b. Signature Block 
A signature block is frequently added to the back of a credit card. This signa-
ture block is signed by the authorized user when they receive the card. There are a 
number of problems associated with this form of authentication. If the card is intercepted 
before being signed, either in delivery of the card, or if the user forgets to sign it, an unau-
thorized user can sign it and use the card. Another problem is that ink is easily removed 
from the signature block and again the unauthorized user can sign it and use it. A final 
problem is that signatures can easily be copied. Since the unauthorized user can see what 
the signature is supposed to look like, he can spend a few moments perfecting the signa-
ture and duplicate it. Expecting a person to differentiate between the signature on the 
card and the one being presented may be beyond the human capability. Some newer cards 
allow the electronic recording of the signature on the card, under the laminate. While this 
helps by making the signature more difficult to alter, it does not eliminate the possibility of 
copying the signature. 
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2. Authentication of the Access Device 
As with the authentication of the individual, the human authentication of the access 
device uses visual cues. The visual appearance of the card must be easily recognizable to 
the authenticator. Several technologies aid in this visual identification. 
a. Name Embossing 
Name embossing on cards has been used since the charge-a-plates of the 
1950s. This technology provides some authentication ability of the access device, but its 
use is limited. The undetectable changing of the name embossed on a card is relatively dif-
ficult and would provide minimal advantage. Name embossing is much more often used as 
a convenient form of data capture rather than a true authenticating method. 
b. Holographic Seals and Images 
The physical appearance of the card is the most common visual authentication 
cue. The plastic material of the card can contain dyes and designs which are difficult to 
duplicate. A recent addition is the use of holographic seals added to the card. These 
holograms, while relatively inexpensive to mass produce, are difficult and expensive to 
forge. Images can also be added to the layers of laminate, making the opening, altering, 
and resealing of the cards difficult. While these methods do provide some protection 
against counterfeiting, they still rely on the person checking the card to make the decision 
that it is genuine. It also still relies on the individual's ability to correctly authenticate the 
user. 
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Recent developments in holographic imaging include the advent of machine 
verifiable holograms. These holograms are discussed under the machine authentication of 
the access device section of this chapter. 
D. AUTHENTICATION BY MACHINE (AUTOMATED) 
1. Authentication of the Individual 
a. Personal Identification Number or Password 
(1) Fixed. The most common form ofwhat the user knows authentication is 
the Personal Identification Number (PIN) or password. With this type of authentication, a 
card holder is issued or selects a fixed length of numeric or alphanumeric characters. 
Depending on the system these may be from four to ten or more characters in length. 
They may be numbers only, letters only, or any character including punctuation and sym-
bols. The user enters this string when queried by the authentication device. This form of 
authentication is also very insecure. It allows anyone knowing the fixed character string 
to be authenticated. PINs or passwords can be easily obtained by observing the autho-
rized user entering it at the key pad, by guessing, by brute attack, or by obtaining it from 
the system. PINs and passwords change relatively infrequently, adding to the low authen-
tication abilities of this type of system. 
(2) Challenge and Response Systems. Challenge and response systems are also 
known as one-time password systems, because the password changes every time the sys-
tem is accessed. This system uses a static mathematical or logical function instead of the 
standard static character string. The system challenges the user with a number or 
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character set. The user performs the function on this challenge and responds with the cor-
rect password. The system authenticates the user based on their response. One-time 
passwords are more secure than static passwords or PINs, since the password is changing 
each time, making the interception of a password useless. However, their usefulness is 
limited by the complexity of algorithms people can remember. 7 Some systems use more 
complicated functions which are programmed into hand-held devices. However, as easily 
as a token can be lost or stolen, so can these hand-held devices. 
b. Physiological (Biometrics) 
Biometric identification, in the form of fingerprint analysis, has been used for 
over 100 years. However, it was not until the early 1970s that an automated form of bio-
metric identification emerged. These earliest automated systems were hand geometry 
systems. Automated fingerprinting systems did not emerge until the late 1970s. 8 
Unlike PIN or password systems, biometric systems do not have a clear yes/no 
answer each time a verification is attempted. With a PIN or password, the user either has 
it correct or not. In a biometric authentication system, the image to be authenticated will 
rarely produce an exact match with the reference image. This is not because the attributes 
change that frequently, but rather because the recording of the image will vary slightly 
each time. The attribute will be placed at a slightly different angle, with different pressure, 
7 Pfleeger, Charles, P., Security in Computing, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 
1989, pp. 233-234. 
8 Miller, Benjamin, "Biometric Identification: The Power to Protect People, Places 
and Privacy," CardTech/SecurTech '94 Conference Proceedings, 1994, pp. 193-201. 
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and there will be different contaminants on the recording device as well as the attribute. 
Therefore, these systems must operate in gray areas, and a confidence level must be used 
to determine whether the attribute matches or not. Physiological biometrics produce more 
consistent sampling than the behavioral techniques do.9 
There are many methods of capturing biometric data and matching it with a 
previously captured image. These techniques include digitizing of imaged features, least 
squares fits, filtering, Fourier transforms, and neural methods of pattern recognition. Most 
of these techniques are well guarded secrets of the device manufacturers, 10 so it will not be 
possible to provide a complete discussion of the intricacies of each system's operations. 
Instead, this section will discuss the basic operation of the system, and some of the rele-
vant issues in using the system. Where available performance figures, in the form of false 
rejection rates (FRRs) and false acceptance rates (FARs), are provided. As discussed in 
Chapter II, a FRR is the rejection of a valid user, and FAR is the authentication of an un-
authorized user. 
A brief discussion of neural networks is appropriate at this point. Unlike 
conventional data processing techniques, neural networks are "trained" rather than pro-
grammed. They develop their own solutions to problems through exposure to examples. 
In this manner it is possible for a system to learn. An example is neural network use in 
training a device to recognize a person's handwriting and being able to convert it to typed 
9 Carter, 1994, p. 403. 
10 Holmes, 1993, p. 319. 
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text. The longer the person uses the system, the better the system's recognition of their 
handwriting becomes. Neural networks are well suited to biometric authentication 
because they can learn to adapt to biometric features that slowly change over time.
11 
( 1) Fingerprint. Fingerprinting is the most widely used biometric identification 
technique. 12 The fingerprint is an excellent attribute to base an identification system on 
since it is stable and unique from birth to death. The chance oftwo people having the 
same fingerprints is less than one in one billion. 
13 Fingerprint systems use a variety of 
different techniques to form templates using data from the print's end points, junctions, 
locations, relative geometry, and number of ridges. 
14 This process is referred to as minu-
tiae matching. The data required to perform a minutiae match can be collected in a num-
ber of different ways, the most common being based on frustrated total internal reflection 
spectroscopy (FTIR). This uses a light source which shines on the finger being presented. 
The reflected light is then collected by a photo detector and evaluated. Recent use of 
ultrasound imaging for fingerprints as well as other biometrics has shown promising 
results. 
Because of its long time use in law enforcement applications, there is a 
general stigmatism around fingerprints as a form of authentication. Fingerprints left at a 
11 Sheppard, Colin, "A Neural Network Approach to Fingerprint Verification," 
CardTech/SecurTech '94 Conference Proceedings, 1994, p. 185. 
12 1bid., p. 183. 
13 Miller, 1994, p. 197. 
14 1bid. 
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crime scene have been used to convict many criminals. In contrast to many other biomet-
ric identifiers, fingerprints can be left on almost any surface. Most other biometric 
identification methods require the use of a sophisticated reader, and cannot be collected 
without the individual present and in close contact with the reader. While this may be an 
advantage in some systems, such as deterring the receipt of multiple food stamp benefits, it 
is a disadvantage in systems where strong user acceptance is desired. 15 
Skin surface conditions adversely effect quality of a fingerprint scan. Com-
mon elements found on the finger can severely degrade recognition performance, such as 
dirt or oil in the ridge valleys, damage due to injury, or worn down ridges due to a per-
son's occupation. 16 People also purposely alter their fingerprint appearance through the 
use of chemicals. Fingerprint readers also cannot distinguish between a living finger, and a 
latex copy or one that has been removed from the body. 
Current fingerprint systems have a false rejection rate of about three per-
cent, and false acceptance rates of around one in one million. These capable fingerprint 
systems require between 750 and 1,000 data bytes to represent an accurate template. 17 
However, a technique has been developed which can match a fingerprint in as little as 918 
data bits Gust over 100 bytes), small enough to be saved in tracks I and 3 ofan ISO 
standard magnetic stripe card. 18 The reliability of these systems is yet to be determined. 
15 Ibid., p. 198. 
16 Schneider, J.K., "Ultrasound for Biometric Capture," CardTech/SecurTech '93 
Conference Proceedings, 1993, p. 333. 
17 Miller, 1994, p. 197. 
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(2) Hand Geometry Recognition. A hand geometry recognition system uses 
the lengths, widths and/or thickness of the hand and/or fingers to create a unique template 
for each individual. These systems may use anywhere from a dozen to several hundred 
points to construct this unique template. A hand geometry recognition reader normally 
provides a plate on which to place one's hand, and may even include pegs to aid with the 
proper placement of the hand for reading. 
19 A variety of methods for reading the hand 
geometry are currently being used, including laser, photo-imaging, and ultrasound. These 
systems are able to measure lengths within thousandths of an inch. The more sop his-
ticated the system, and the greater the number of points it samples to construct its 
template, the greater the security, and the fewer the FAR and FRR errors. It is possible 
that two individuals can have hands of the same dimensions, but the more data that is col-
lected about the hand the less chance there is for commonalties. This author's research 
indicates hand geometry appears to be less unique than other biometric characteristics. 
The major drawback to hand geometry is the expected change over time. 
As the body ages, the hand will change shape. In addition, injury and swelling due to wa-
ter retention, or weight gain can significantly influence the shape of the hand. There is a 
small portion of the population for whom this technique would not be appropriate, such as 
amputees and people with certain birth defects. Similar to fingerprint systems, hand 
18 Hollingum, Jack, "Automated Fingerprint Analysis Offers Fast Verification," Sensor 
Review, Vol. 12, No.3, March 1992, pp. 12-15. 
19 Recognition Systems, Inc., ID3D HandKey Brochure, 1994. 
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geometry systems cannot distinguish between a living hand and a latex copy or one which 
has been removed from the user. 
This type of recognition is a non-invasive measurement and has a high user 
acceptance. Users are comfortable with the system because the scan is done with them 
maintaining full view of their hand. It is also not an identifying characteristic outside of 
the scanner. Users are less likely to feel their hand geometry will be used for other 
purposes. Hand geometry systems are unaffected by dirt, cuts, and other minor skin varia-
tions. Newer hand geometry readers use both the top and side views of the hand to form 
a template. Reference templates for hand geometry are under 10 bytes, the smallest of any 
biometric authentication technique. 20 However, there is some reluctance with this 
technology, stemming from a lack of confidence in the differentiation ability of hand 
geometry and the fact that this technology is old. While the more capable hand geometry 
system have accuracy and differentiation results rivaling any other biometric, 21 they are 
often shunned for "more advanced technologies." 
(3) Retinal Scan. The blood vessels on the rear of the eye, the retina, form a 
unique pattern. Retinal scans are performed by directing an infrared light source through 
the pupil to the retina. The reflected pattern is captured by a camera and converted into a 
unique template. Reference templates for retinal scans are about 35 bytes in size,22 which 
20 Miller, 1994, p. 198. 
21 Recognition Systems, Inc., 1994. 
22 Miller, 1994, p. 198. 
91 
is considerably less than most other biometric techniques. There is some fear of damag
e 
to the eye and vision associated with the long term use of these systems. While there h
as 
been no evidence to support this, the public fear still exists. The difficulty involved in 
du-
plicating these minute patterns on the rear of the eye results in a higher level of system
 se-
curity. Retinal scanners are also better at detecting non-living presentations, since m
ost 
systems require the user to focus on a point in order to provide the correct representati
on. 
( 4) Iris Scan. Iris scan is similar in operation to a retinal scan, however it 
images the front of the eye or iris features. The patterns of flecks on the iris provide a
s 
unique a pattern as any other biometric technique. 
Iris scans use a video image to capture the pattern. This video image does 
not require the user to focus on a target, nor does it require the use of infrared light, an
d it 
can be accomplished at distances as great as a few feet.
23 This has lead iris scan techno-
logy to meet with greater public approval. This distance factor has allowed the genera
l 
public to feel more comfortable with the belief that there will not be any damage to the
 
eye. This system also has an advantage in that it can differentiate between a living eye 
and 
a deceased or reproduced eye by the constant variations in pupil size of the human eye
. 
Currently, iris scan technology is just emerging, with the first products 
expected to reach market late in 1994.




and the FRR/F AR data remains to be seen, however it is expected to be about the same 
size as a retinal scan. 
(5) Face Recognition. There are several facial feature recognition systems 
under development. These systems uses a form of machine vision to develop pattern rec-
ognition. Machine vision, in combination with infrared scans of facial temperatures is also 
being investigated. There are several complicating aspects of facial recognition, including 
facial expression, beards, haircuts, makeup and the like. There is a great deal of interest 
and work being conducted in this field, however currently there are few products on the 
market. 25 Time will tell if face recognition is a viable, secure biometric authentication 
technique or not. 
(6) Hand Vein Patterns. Hand vein pattern recognition technology is a rela-
tively new technology which likewise has few marketable products. Most work in this 
area is focusing on the use of ultrasound to obtain the unique pattern of the veins in the 
wrist and/or hand. The user acceptance, error rates, cost, and uniqueness of the patterns 
obtained in this relatively new technology remain to be seen. 
(7) Other Technologies. Most other biometric identification technologies are 
still too large and cumbersome to be use in an authentication environment. These include 
things like DNA sampling, hair analysis, blood matching, skin samples, dental records, and 
the like. The majority of these methods are currently reserved for crime scene analysis and 
criminal prosecutions, where time and financial constraints are not an issue. However, in 
25 lbid., pp. 200-201. 
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the future these techniques may evolve far enough to become viable card authentication 
techniques. 
The use of ultrasound for biometric imaging appears to be possible in the 
near future. It can be used for fingerprint, 26 and hand vein pattern recognition. Currently, 
ultrasonic imaging is prohibitively expensive. Recently, ultrasound technology has made 
great advances in capability and decreases in price. As the medical uses for ultrasound 
increase the demand and volume of ultrasound devices, the cost should decrease. Ultra-
sonic imaging may be a cost effective authentication alternative in the near future. 
c. Behavioral 
(1) Signature Dynamics Verification. Signature dynamic verification systems, 
like many other authentication systems, can be designed in a number of ways to capture 
any number of different aspects of the signature. To construct a template for the signa-
ture, the most common form uses three data fields; the two-dimensional representation of 
the signature, and time. From the two dimensional signature and time values, the speed 
that the person is signing can be calculated. 27 Some more capable systems may also use 
amount of pressure with the paper, but this is relatively difficult and expensive to capture, 
measure, and analyze with current technology. 
These systems are relatively secure in that they capture sufficient amount of 
data to make the signature truly unique. They also eliminate some of the problems 
26 Schneider, 1993, p. 333. 
27 Alexandre, 1994, p. 151. 
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associated with human signature verification by using the time component. While it may 
be easy to learn to forge someone's signature, it is much more difficult to be able to do so 
with the same speed and pen strokes. 
Signatures change and evolve over time. Current technology, in the form 
of neural networks, allow the signature verification device to "learn" these evolutions. 
They can allow slight changes in the signature with successive accesses and can continu-
ally update the base signature. These systems are subject to the normal injury and physical 
disability related problems that plague other systems. 
(2) Keystroke Dynamics. Keystroke dynamics (also called typing rhythms) 
analyze the typing styles of different individuals. These analysis can be constantly taking 
place in the background on a system. The requirement for users to type long strings of 
characters causes this system to be oflimited use in access control situations where 
authentication must take place in seconds. However, this technology is eagerly awaited by 
computer security professionals, 28
 where longer typing times are common and access 
needs to be constantly monitored. 
(3) Voice Recognition. Voice recognition is accomplished by converting 
sounds spoken by humans into electrical signals. Current voice recognition systems use 
information derived from acoustic measurements of speech. These include parameters of 
pitch, spectral magnitudes, formant frequencies (resonant frequencies of the vocal track), 
and energy profiles. 29 These parameters are then compared to the recorded voice pattern 
28 Miller, 1994, p. 200. 
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of the authorized user. Different systems employ one or more of these measurements to 
carry out the verification or authentication. These systems pattern match the speech sig-
nal, as a time-ordered set of features, to a stored template. Templates can be composed of 
multiple words, a single word, syllables, or phonemes. Most systems use either single or 
multiple words. The input utterance template is then compared with the reference tern-
plate by aligning the two templates at equivalent points in time. Some stretching or 
compression of the time in the template may be necessary, or the time dimension may be 
used as another authentication measurement. 
30 
Speech is the most natural means of communication and, therefore, user 
acceptance of voice authentication systems is very high.
31 However, several problems 
with this technique exist. A human voice can be recorded and played back, thus allowing 
an unauthorized user access, unless the system is set up to allow a random selection of a 
group ofwords from a larger subset. 32 Voice authentication systems set up in this manner 
are similar to a query and response password systems. Another difficulty with voice 
authentication is the amount ofbackground noise. High background noise areas are not 
suitable for voice recognition systems. In addition, voice recognition systems do take 
slightly longer to complete an authentication than many other authentication techniques. 
29 Naik, Jayant, M., "Speaker Verification: A Tutorial," IEEE Communications 
Magazine, Vol. 28, No. 1, January 1990, p. 42. 
30 1bid., p. 43. 
31 Ibid., p. 42. 
32 Revillet, 1994, p. 165. 
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Typical voice authentication systems with quality microphones in a quiet 
environment can obtain high accuracy levels. By varying the acceptance threshold, it is 
possible to drive FAR below 0.1% while maintaining 2-3% FRR, or to obtain a FRR of 
less then 1% while maintaining a FAR ofS-10%. 33 
2. Authentication of the Access Device 
Authentication of the access device can take many forms. In its simplest form, the 
system checks only that the card is of the right type. Currently, the most advanced check 
involve some sophisticated cryptographic challenge and response. This section reviews 
the more common machine authentication of access device techniques. 
a. Optical Character Recognition 
Optical character recognition (OCR) is a technique which allows the card 
reader to read stylized characters off the card. These characters can either be raised, as in 
the case of an embossed name on a card, or just printed on the card, as they are on checks. 
This technique provides little security, since strips of OCR printed tape, either raised or 
not, can be affixed to any card. This technique, has little true security application and is 
rather used as an automated data capture technique. 
b. Magnetic Ink 
Magnetic ink character recognition (MICR) is a process in which the ink used 
to print characters is encoded to be machine readable. This technique likewise provides 
33 Naik, 1990, p. 45. 
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little security because it can be easily duplicated and applied to media. Magnetic ink is 
used mostly for automated data capture on paper items such as checks. 
c. Electronically Verifiable Holograms 
Electronically verifiable holograms, much like their visual counterparts, can be 
applied anywhere on the card. With this technique, the hologram is normally placed under 
the laminate of the card. With some card technologies, it is possible to place the hologram 
directly on the card in the area where someone would have to access in order to tamper 
with the card. Magnetic stripe cards are the best example of this. Holograms are being 
placed over the magnetic stripe, to ensure it has not been accessed and tampered with. 
While this technique does provide some security against tampering with the card, it does 
not guarantee that the magnetic stripe has not been electronically altered without access. 
Electronically verifiable holograms are relatively inexpensive to mass produce, and are dif-
ficult, time consuming, and expensive to duplicate. This desirable combination may have 
even greater application in the near future. 
A related technology, called reflective particle tagging was developed at Sandia 
National Laboratory (SNL). This technique was developed to uniquely identify individual 
strategic weapons, thereby aiding in the counting of these weapons for arms control verifi-
cations. It was "designed to be secure from copying and transfer even after being left 
under the control of a very determined adversary for a number of years. "
34 This technique 
uses tags which are composed of reflective particles suspended in an adhesive. The 
34 Tolk, Keith M., "Random Patterns and Biometrics for Counterfeit Deterrence," 
CardTech/SecurTech '94 Conference Proceedings, 1994, p. 144. 
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reflective particles are formed by crushing a crystalline material into particles of irregular 
size and shape. Once suspended in the adhesive, these particles form a unique, machine 
readable tag which is difficult to duplicate. The reading of the tags can be accomplished in 
a number of ways, including cameras, and imaging processing. 35 This technology has not 
had mass appeal in card technology systems, since each tag contains a unique pattern that 
must be recorded for reference. However, as the cost of machine data storage capacity 
continues to decrease, and the need for high security card authentication increases, this 
technology may gain mass appeal. 
d Cryptographic Techniques 
Cryptography is defined as the process of writing in or deciphering secret code. 
The use of secret codes dates back thousands ofyears, however, it was not until the first 
World War that sophisticated machine devices were used to perform cryptographic func-
tions. 36 This section reviews the fundamentals of cryptography, introduces some of the 
more common cryptographic techniques, and provides examples of how cryptography can 
be applied to card authentication. 
Figure 15 provides a block diagram of a typical encryption and decryption 
scheme. The scheme can work with or without a key. Systems which operate without a 
key, rely on keeping the nature of the algorithm secret, and are referred to as restricted. 
However, these systems provide inadequate security for most applications. 37 In systems 
35 Ibid. 
36 Schneier, Bruce, Applied Cryptography: Protocols. Algorithms. and Source Code in 
.C., Wiley and Sons, NY, 1993, p. xi. 
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- ------------~----~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~---
that use keys, the keys are can take on any one of many values, and generally the larger the 
number the better. A cryptographic algorithm, also called a cipher, uses the key to trans-
form the plain text into its encrypted form. These ciphers are normally mathematical 











Figure 15 -- Typical Encryption and Decryption Scheme 
There are also encryption schemes which only contain the first cryptographic 
algorithm, with or without a key, and are referred to as one-way functions. In these 
schemes there is no method to regenerate the original plaintext. While at first this scheme 
may seem useless, it is actually extensively used. Systems that compare the input authenti-
cation request to some stored reference authentication data, frequently use one-way 
functions to avoid maintaining a file of everyone's authentication codes. When a request 
37 Ibid., p. 2. 
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for authentication is received by the system, it performs the same one-way function on the 
request data, and compares the ciphertext results to the stored ciphertext reference data. 
There are two major variations of systems which use both blocks and keys. 
The difference is whether the two keys are the same or different. In symmetric key 
authentication systems, where the keys are the same, the sender and receiver must know 
the same key to communicate. Authentication is completed by the sending the prover an 
encrypted random number, if the prover can decrypt the number and return it, the prover 
must possess the same key, and the verifier accepts the prover's identity. In systems where 
there are different encryption and decryption keys, authentication is carried out by the 
prover generating an electronic signature with their secret key. Verifiers accept the 
identity ofthe sender, ifthey can decrypt the signature with the sender's public key. Since 
these systems require matched private and public key sets be generated by a trusted 
authority, key management becomes an issue, and invoh,e.d key exchange protocols are 
frequently used. 
Cryptography can be applied a oomber of ways to authenticate an access 
device. Both logic capable and memory only cards can employ cryptographic authentica-
tion, however, they do so differently. Logic capable cards can maintain the required key, 
and can perform interactive cryptographic functions to prove their authenticity. Both 
symmetric and asymmetric cryptography may be used with these cards. Logic capable 
cards are also capable of authenticating the card reader, and in this way can ensure against 
bogus information being written to the card by a non-authentic terminal. 38 
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Memory only cards, can have the data stored on them encrypted. In this 
manner, the cards authentication is performed by the decryption of data. If it decrypts 
properly, it must have been encrypted, before being stored on the card, using the appropri-
ate key. Depending on the type of storage and encryption used, it may be possible to copy 
encrypted data from the card and produce forged cards. This is easily remedied with time 
stamps, changing bits, codes, and a host of other techniques. This technique can also be 
used to protect data from access by unauthorized personnel. To accomplish this, different 
keys can be used to store different data. In this fashion, the card reader can only access 
data which it has the proper key for, all other data would be unreadable. 
The most common cryptographic techniques used in association with card 
technologies in the United States are listed below. A complete review ofthe operation of 
each system is beyond the scope of this paper, however, the references provide several 
sources for further information. 
Symmetric Key Cryptography: 
Asymmetric Key Cryptography: 
Data Encryption Standard (DES) 
Digital Signature Standard (DSS) and 
Rivest Shamir Adelman (RSA) 
e. Zero-Knowledge Authentication 
A final means of machine authentication of access devices, is the zero-
knowledge authentication technique. This method does not use passwords, keys, or 
cryptographic methods for authenticating the access device. Rather, the card acceptor 
deduces that the access device possesses the secret accreditation by issuing one or more 
38 Nelson, 1994, p. 48. 
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challenges, and the access device providing an equal number of responses. This method is 
relatively new, having been introduced in the late 1980s, and has not been extensively 
employed as yet. 39 However, it is known that zero-knowledge systems require a more 
sophisticated microprocessor, increase card cost, and further reduce memory space.40 
E. SUMMARY OF AUTHENTICATION TECHNIQUES 
There is a wide variety of authentication techniques available today, and even more 
projected to be available in the near future. Figure 14 provided a summary of the relation-
ships between these techniques. The selection of the authentication technique to be used 
in a card system, may be as important as the selection of the card technology itself 
39 lbid., p. 52. 
40 lbid., p. 48. 
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V. NEW FRAMEWORK BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The basis for the new framework presented in Chapter VI, is not only DoD doctrine, 
but progressive acquisition strategy as well. This chapter presents DoD support for the 
views adopted by the new framework, as well as several important theories and concepts 
used in the new framework. The first section of this chapter reviews the evolutionary 
acquisition concept, and relates it to card technologies. The next section discusses DoD 
and federal government information technology procurement strategies and directives, and 
how they relate to the concepts used in the framework. The final section outlines the basis 
for many of the theories and concepts employed within the new framework. 
B. EVOLUTIONARY MIGRATION CONCEPT 
The evolutionary migration concept of systems acquisition has been in use for over ten 
years. The Joint Logistics Commanders (JLCs) define evolutionary acquisition as "an 
acquisition strategy which may be used to procure a system expected to evolve during 
development within an approved architectural framework to achieve an overall system 
capability. "1 This concept is frequently applied to command, control, and communication 
systems, however, it is applicable to any system which is expected to evolve during its life 
cycle. Card technology systems are in this category. The framework presented in Chapter 
1 Hirsch, 1988, pp. 23-26. 
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VI, uses evolutionary migration concepts, and presents a method of selection for evolu-
tionary card technology systems. 
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SUPPORT 
The DoD and the federal government support many of the concepts which are incor-
porated in the new framework presented in the next chapter. This section reviews some 
current DoD and federal government initiatives and directives related to information 
technology system management and procurement. 
1. National Performance Review 
The Clinton administration has produced several publications dealing with rein-
venting government. The National Performance Review, requested by President Clinton 
and lead by and Vice Presjdent Gore, was established to review federal programs and 
identify areas for improvement. 'Vhit1e these reports provide little substantive information 
on the means to achieve the discussed improvements, they do embrace many of the con-
cepts which will be used in the new framework. Specifically, these reports support the use 
of life cycle cost minimization evaluations (as constra!ned by performance requirements), 
vice acquisition cost minimization. 2 This acknowledges the problems associated with the 
short-term focused, lowest bidder mentalities of many previous DoD acquisition 
strategies, and allows for recognition of factors other than price in defining a "best value" 
altemative.3 These reports also support the use of performance-based contracting.4 The 
2 Clinton, Bill J., President and Albert Gore, Jr., Vice President, Technology for 
America's Economic Growth, A New Direction to Build Economic Strength, February 22, 
1993, p. 23. 
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new framework expands this concept to include performance-based target system defini-
tions and performance-based migratory path comparison. 
2. Corporate Information Management 
The creation of the Corporate Information Management (CIM) initiative began in 
July, 1989, when the House Armed Services Committee, responding to the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) reports of mismanagement of automated data processing in the 
DoD. The GAO suggested that funding for DoD investments in Information Technology 
(IT) should cease until the DoD established a comprehensive strategy for its information 
systems which eliminated redundancy and enforced standardization. In response to Con-
gress' suggestion, the CIM office was created in October, 1989. In the fiscal year 1991 
Defense Appropriations Act, enacted October, 1990, Congress allocated one billion dol-
Iars of the Information Systems (IS) funding request directly to the CIM office, allowing 
them to begin implementation of CIM initiatives. These funds would be given to the 
requesting agencies only if the system they desired to fund met CIM requirements. The 
message was clear, all IT/IS proposals must have DoD wide standardization and 
integration capability. 5 In July, 1991, the CIM initiative was expanded to include business 
3 Gore, Albert, Vice President, Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs 
Less, Report ofthe National Performance Review, U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, DC, September 7, 1993, p. 165. 
4 Clinton, 1993, p. 22. 
5 Kotheimer, William C., "A Database to Support DoD Business Process Redesign," 
Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, Monterey, CA, September 1992, pp. 1-2. 
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process redesign (BPR).6 BPR involves the examining of processes, and the elimination of 
unnecessary and redundant ones, before receiving funds to automate. This initiative also 
includes the combining of multiple legacy systems into single systems, and the determina-
tion of best of breed systems to migrate toward. An extensive application of this is being 
undertaken by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Center for Integration 
and Interoperability. DISA has identified 1271 legacy applications in 74 different func-
tiona! activities that have potential for migration to common systems. 7 The legacy 
applications identified by DISA are in a multitude of functional areas, including command 
and control, finance, health, procurement, transportation, and human resources. Many of 
these functions could be carried out by card technologies, and the migratory methodology 
followed by DISA could provide the target system definition in the first step of the new 
framework. 
Another tool which is applied under the CIM initiative is Functional Economic 
Analysis (FEA). FEA is composed of two parts; functional analysis and economic analy-
sis. Functional analysis involves analyzing what the organization does and improving 
processes based on this in-depth understanding. Economic analysis involves gaining an 
understanding of the potential value or future economic benefits of some investment. 8 The 
economic analysis portion of the FEA recommends attaching performance measures to 
6 0ffice of Assistant Secretary ofDefense for Command, Control, Communications, 
and Intelligence, Director of Defense Information, Status of the Department ofDefense 
Corporate Information Management Initiative, October 27, 1992, p. 7. 
7 DoD, Defense Information Systems Agency, DoD Information Integration Strategy 
Tree Diagrams, (Vol. 1), Ver. 5, March 1994, pp. i-iv. 
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benefits, to be able to track savings accomplishment. The new framework derives these 
performance measures for card technologies. FEA also discusses risk assessment, life 
cycle costs and the construction of TO-BE activities,9 all of which are incorporated in the 
new framework. 
3. Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence for 
the Warrior 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence for the Warrior 
(C4IFTW) is a publication produced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and provides 
visionary guidance for present and future command, control, communications, computers, 
and intelligence (C41) support. It envisions the migration to an integrated, interoperable 
battlefield C41 system, that starts with the Warrior's requirements. Although this guidance 
is not in the form of a structured methodology for C41 system definition, development, 
and acquisition, it does provide a roadmap to reach the objective. 10 C4IFTW offers a con-
siderable amount of support for concepts used within the new framework, including 
discussions of migratory systems in general and the migratory nature ofC41 systems. It 
also discusses "feasibility issues such as interoperability, capacity, cost, security, and avail-
ability", and how these "can be migrated into these systems and at what cost." 11 Likewise, 
8 Corporate Information Management Process Improvement Methodology for DoD 
Functional Managers, 2nd ed., D. Appleton Company, Inc., Fairfax, VA, 1993, p. 13. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Powell, Colin L., Gen, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, C41 For the Warrior, 
June 12, 1992, p. 1. 
11 Ibid., p. 7. 
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it recognizes that "dramatic changes are occurring ... in the technologies that drive com-
puting and communicating tools and techniques .... "12 C4IFTW provides a migratory 
path to the goal C4I architecture, similar to the method suggested in the new framework. 
This migratory path is complete with waypoints, (a concept which will be discussed within 
the new framework) appropriately labeled quick fix and mid-term. 
4. DoD Directive 5000.1 and Instruction 5000.2 
The subject ofDoD Directive 5000.1 and Instruction 5000.2 is Defense Acquisi-
tion. The Directive provides a summary of acquisition policies and describes 
responsibilities of key officials and forums. The Instruction provides the details needed to 
implement the acquisition policies. Together, these two publications "establish a disci-
plined management approach for acquiring systems and materiel that satisfy the operation-
al user's needs. "13 This is accomplished through the establishment of two processes. The 
first is "an integrated framework for translating broadly stated mission needs into stable, 
affordable acquisition programs that meet the operational user's needs", 14 and th~ second is 
"a rigorous, event-oriented management process for acquiring quality products that em-
phasizes effective acquisition planning, improved communication with users and 
12 Ibid., p. 9. 
13 Department ofDefense, "Defense Acquisition," DoD Directive 5000.1, February 23, 
1991, p. 1. 
14 Department of Defense, "Defense Acquisition Management Policies and 
Procedures," DoD Instruction 5000.2, February 23, 1991, p. 2. 
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aggressive risk analysis .... "15 The Directive presents an integrated management framework 
(IMF) "intended to provide the basis for developing and publishing acquisition manage-
ment policies ... that are consistent with and support the requirements generation system 
... described herein. "16 The IMF has an in-depth requirements generation system that pro-
duces information for decision makers on projected mission needs. The IMF supports the 
evolutionary approach to system acquisition and enjoins "decision makers to make cost-
performance-schedule trade-offs at critical points in the program's implementation. "17 The 
mission needs generation phase of the ll\.1F is similar in concept to target system defini-
tion portion of the new framework presented in the next chapter. The cost- performance-
schedule trade-offs in the new framework further capture the time preference aspect for 
performance, and make these decisions more apparent. The new framework leads the de-
cision maker from broad needs, to functions, to technical capabilities required for support 
of these functions. In contrast, the IMF goes from broad needs, to performance objec-
tives, to system-specific requirements. While this may be useful for static systems acquisi-
tion, it is much more difficult to apply to evolutionary systems. 
5. Technical Architecture for Information Management 
The DoD Technical Architecture Framework for Information Management 
(T AFIM) is a draft, eight volume publication produced by the Defense Information 
15 Ibid. 
16 DoD Directive 5000.1, 1991, p. 3. 
17 Ibid. 
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Systems Agency (DISA), Center for Architecture. This publication is intended to be the 
means for DoD to achieve its Information Technology (IT) and Information Management 
(IM) goals. Whereas the C4IFTW and CIM initiatives provided the vision of where DoD 
should be going in terms of information technology management (ITM), T AFIM provides 
the plan of how to get there. To this end, TAFIM provides guidance in several areas, 
including architecture concepts, design, acquisition, security, standards, and human com-
puter interface ofiT and 1M products. T AFIM also offers two methodologies; the Tech-
nical Reference Model (TRM) providing the conceptual model for information system 
services and their interfaces, and the Standards-Based Architecture (SBA) Planning Meth-
odology. T AFIM volume four presents the seven step SBA planning process, which leads 
the user from project initiation through implementation and administration. For each step, 
T AFIM provides an in-depth discussion of the objectives, scope, deliverables, critical suc-
cess factors, constraints, task list, effectiveness measures, and completion criteria, as well 
as required tools and staffing skills. 
While this draft SBA provides excellent detail on accomplishment of steps toward 
a new system, the SBA methodology has some flaws. Noticeably, the temporal compo-
nent of these systems is neglected. The new framework, presented in the next chapter, is 
an alternative methodology to the one presented in TAFIM. Much of the supporting guid-
ance presented in T AFIM is applicable to the new framework as well and will not be reit-
erated within the new framework. 
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D. THEORIES AND CONCEPTS 
The new framework incorporates several theories and concepts. While these are not 
controversial in nature, a presentation and discussion of each is appropriate background at 
this point. There are other basic concepts which could be discussed before presentation of 
the new framework, however, the reader is expected to be familiar with most of these con-
cepts. The few concepts which are presented here, are presented for completeness, and to 
ensure reader/author commonalty of terminology and concept application. 
1. Analytical Hierarchy Process 
The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) was developed by Thomas L. Saaty and 
is designed to solve complex problems involving multiple criteria. The process can be 
used to create values for both the relative importance of decision criteria and the relative 
preferences between alternatives within these decision criteria. AHP is used in the new 
framework in both of these roles. It is used to weigh the relative importance of the vari-
ous measures of performance, as well as to weigh the relative ability of each migratory 
system in these performance measures. 
AHP was chosen for a number of reasons. The comparison of a finite set of per-
formance measures and migratory path options lends itself well to AHP's pair-wise com-
parison of items, and is relatively easy to apply. Although there has been much 
discussion of the problems with the accuracy in AHP weights, 18 it does produce reasonable 
information for which to base decisions on. Given the relative inaccuracies of other parts 
18 Dyer, James, Thomas Saaty, Patrick Harker, and Luis Vargas, "Discussion of AHP", 
Management Science, Vol. 36, No.3, March 1990, pp. 247-275. 
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of the framework, such as future cost estimations, economic forecasting, and 
performance 
measures, the AHP estimations are judged by the author not to be a significant source of 
error. However, other analysts may conclude other weighting schemes, such 
as SMART, 
are more appropriate, or may opt to use an alternate method. Alternate meth
ods include 
multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT), goal programming, utility theory, and others. 
2. Commercial-off-the-Shelf 
Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) is a term used to define products, systems, sys-
tem components, software, etc., which are available for sale publicly. The op
posite of 
this, are products which are produced solely for the government. There has b
een much 
attention to the purc.hase of COTS pttUducts verses the deveJopmel111t of applic
ation specific 
items for significant costs savings. The new framework could be applied to e
ither COTS 
or developmental applications. Smart card technologies are well vendor supp
orted at this 
point, and most procurement will be of COTS products. Likewise, databases
 to store cMd 
system data could contain minimum developmmta1 effort and utilize as much 
COTS prod-
ucts as possible. 
Related to COTS, is Government-off-the-shelf (GOTS), which are products which 
have been developed for government use, and are readily available to governm
ent agen-
cies. To the government consumer, these items are similar to COTS products
, but may be 
available at substantial savings. 
Although not captured within the new framework itself, the decision to use a 
COTS or GOTS product verses a full development effort effects many aspect
s of the new 
113 
framework. The costs associated with a development effort would be considerably more, 
and would be substantially different in composition. The new framework, although it 
could be applied to a development problem, is geared toward COTS or GOTS product 
acquisition. 
3. Open Architecture 
Open architecture is likewise not captured within the new framework, however it 
is an important decision. Open architecture systems allow the product to be integrated 
with products of other manufacturers. Open architecture provides a standardized means 
of conducting functions such as data transfer, database access, card access, storage, and 
the like. In contrast, proprietary systems are ones belonging to a specific manufacturer, 
and are not compatible with other systems. Selecting proprietary systems limits the 
choices, especially for future migratory upgrades, to a specific product line. 
4. Discounting to Obtain Present Values 
Within the new framework, the concept of discounting to obtain present values is 
applied to the future expenditures estimated in the cost model. Since many of the expen-
ditures in a migratory system will be delayed for many years, the discounting of these costs 
plays an important role in final migratory path selection. The reader is assumed to be 
aware that time effects the value of money. Therefore, this section describes discounting 
application, but not the theory and reasoning behind discounting. 
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To obtain the present value (PV) of a future cost, the PV discounting formula is 
used. This formula is given as Equation 3. 
where: F n = future cost in period n 
i = period interest rate 
n = number of periods 
(3) 
This formula can be applied to any period definition, such as months, quarters, years, etc., 
as long as the interest rate per period is used. This allows for simplified calculations 
within the framework, by aligning this with the period used for the measures of perform-
ance calculations. Determination of the appropriate interest rate to use is a more difficult 
problem. Ideally, the interest rate used should be the weighted average opportunity costs 
of the money to be used. This is difficult to estimate, since these costs are in the future 
and therefore the interest rate is a future interest rate. While it is possible to use different 
interest rates for different periods, based on economic forecasting, this is rarely done. 
Rather, the formula provided above is used, incorporating an average interest rate for the 
time period. 
The government makes this choice somewhat easier. The DoD requires the use of 
an interest rate of ten percent be used on all project costs and benefits that go over three 
years from project inception date. This figure is designed to represent the weighted aver-
age opportunity cost of taking money from the private sector (the source of government 
funds). It also provides a common basis for economic analysis and prevents the altering of 
the interest rate to make one project look better than another. 19 
19 Haga, William, J., and Robert Lang, "Revised Economic Analysis Procedures for 
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5. Cost Analysis Concepts 
Cost analysis is an art unto itself, and an in-depth discussion of this topic is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. However, to apply the new framework, the decision maker must 
be able to obtain reliable, pertinent cost information for the alternate migratory paths. 
Cost data for currently available technology is relatively easy to obtain form vendors, con-
tractors, other installations using the technology, trade publications, trade conferences, 
and the like. 
However, forecasting expected costs for technology some time in the future is dif-
ficult. What is expensive today and looks to remain expensive, may become reasonable 
through a number of means such as a scientific breakthrough, or a new use for the 
technology which drives volume up and price down. The opposite is less often the case, 
but it is possible to have the costs of technology unexpectedly rise through natural disas-
ters, increased demand without increased availability, or other factors. 
6. Risk Analysis Concepts 
As discussed in Chapter II, risk analysis is a context dependent concept. Risk 
analysis is a technique to identify, characterize, quantify, and evaluate the hazards of a 
project. 20 Security risk analysis, assesses the security risks involved in the project, and de-
terrnines the required amount of security needed. Technological risk assessment, assesses 
ADP," Naval Postgraduate School Manual, Monterey, CA, January 1991, pp. 8-1 through 
10-20. 
20 Modarres, M., What Every Engineer Should Know About Reliability and Risk 
Analysis, Marcel Dekker, Inc., NY, NY, 1992, p. 297. 
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the effects of future technologies not reaching expected levels. Economic risk assessment, 
assesses the effects of economic changes on project completion. 
Risk assessment involves two distinct steps: A qualitative identification, character-
izing, and ranking of the hazards; and a quantitative estimation of the likelihood, and 
consequence of the occurrence of each. The risk level is the sum of the likelihood and 
consequence of occurrence of each undesirable event. Risk levels are most useful when 
consequences can be measured in financial or other measurable terms. In the new frame-
work, risk analysis is used to determine the likelihood of each migration path occurrence. 
The likelihood of occurrence is multiplied by the overall net value of the path, to deter-
mine net expected value of the path. Used in thjs manner, the risk assessment takes into 
account economic and technical risks. Risk assessment, much like cost analysis, involves 
estimates and future predictions, and is an art form. There are inaccuracies involved with 
any technique that involves estimations and future predictions, however, a properly con-
ducted risk analysis can provide reasonable estimates of likelihood and consequence of 
occurrence. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the basis for many of the concepts used within the new frame-
work. It is not intended to be an exhaustive discussion nor an instructional aid to each 
concept, however, it should provide the user with the necessary background and refer-
ences to apply the new framework. 
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VI. A FRAMEWORK FOR CARD SYSTEM SELECTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Framework Purpose and Problem Statement 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a new framework for evaluating evolu-
tionary upgrade paths for card systems. As already discussed, card system procurement is 
evolutionary in nature, as these systems will go through many changes during their useful 
life. As emerging technologies mature, the system will be incrementally upgraded. Sys-
tern procurement alternatives that capture this temporal component are evolutionary 
upgrade paths to some future goal or target system. 
The framework presented here is a functionally-oriented, capability-based 
approach. It is intended to be a step-by-step method which produces information useful to 
the decision maker about alternate evolutionary upgrade paths. 1 The problem answered by 
the new framework is maximize "utility of life cycle performance" less "utility oflife cycle 
cost," subject to technological (physical and human competence) feasibility, target func-
tions and capabilities, and current systems and their capabilities. The required target 
functions and capabilities are a constraint to make the framework a cost-performance 
tradeoff with explicit consideration of the time preference for when the target functionality 
will occur. This simplifies the "real" problem by fixing the target time (the end of the 
1 Egge, Daniel, Q., "A Framework For Evaluating Evolutionary Upgrade Paths of 
Command, Control and Communications Systems," Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, 
Monterey, CA, June 1993, p. 38. 
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planning period) when all the target functions and capabilities must be obtained. The two 
variables, utility oflife cycle performance and utility oflife cycle cost, are not directly 
measurable. However, within the framework, a figure for the utility oflife cycle perform-
ance will be developed using a measure of performance hierarchy and performance 
attribute scales. Life cycle costs will be estimated using standard cost analysis tools. 
These two figures will then be scaled to be of the same magnitude, and now being in the 
same measurement units, can be subtracted from each other. In this fashion, the frame-
work is able to capture the entire life cycle cost and performance figures, including 
evolutionary upgrades, and not just initial procurement, operation and performance 
estimations. It also encompasses technological feasibility issues and system reuse, includ-
ing data and human capital, as well as hardware and software. 
2. The Need for an Effective Evaluation Framework 
As was noted in Chapter II, there are many issues which must be considered in the 
selection of a card technology system. This new framework captures the 12 categories of 
issues presented in Chapter II, and aids the decision maker(s) in making conscious deci-
sions about alternatives, including the placing of weights on their choices. Chapter II 
categories 1 through 8, the performance issues, are incorporated into the measure of per-
formance calculations performed in the third step of the new framework. Category 9, 
system life expectancy, is required to be considered as part of the first step in the frame-
work. Category 10, cost estimation, is captured in the cost estimations made as part of 
the fourth step of the framework. Category 11, risk assessment, is captured in the risk 
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weights required to be applied to each migratory path in step six of the framework. Cate-
gory 12, the temporal component, is addressed in the time preference weights given to the 
measures of performance by the decision maker in step three. 
3. Methodology 
The framework is presented as a step by step procedure, along with some illustra-
tive examples of step application, and comments on step accomplishment. The framework 
presented is geared toward card system procurement, however it could be applied to any 
evolutionary system acquisition. The reader is assumed to have a level of knowledge 
about procurement, cost estimation, system benefit analysis, and other concepts. Where 
appropriate, footnotes are provided so that additional in-depth information on the topic 
may be located. 
B. THE FRAMEWORK 
1. General Discussion 
Before the steps in the framework are presented, a general discussion of the frame-
work assumptions is appropriate. The problem of card technology system acquisition 
could be approached in a number of ways. The goal could be defined in one of three 
ways; getting a set level of performance for a minimum life cycle cost, getting maximum 
performance for a set cost, or some form of cost-benefit tradeoff. The set cost problem is 
not representative of typical DoD procurement. The evolutionary nature of card technol-
ogy systems make evaluation by conventional cost-benefit analysis difficult. The new 
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framework provides a cost-benefit scheme which captures the temporal component. Fig-














Figure 16 --Cost Performance Decision Cunre 
a 
Line a is the performance-cost curve for a card technology. It also represents the 
present limit of technological feasibility. Line b is the intersection point on the cost-
performance curve, given a cost limit ofx. Line cis the intersection point on the cost-
performance curve, given a performance level required ofy. Lined has a slope equal to 
the preference for performance versus cost, and is drawn through the origin. To obtain 
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the optimal cost-benefit tradeoff solution geometrically, line d is shifted in a parallel man-
ner to the point at which it is tangent to the performance-cost curve. That is, the point of 
tangency is the best combination of cost and performance (as represented in the slope as 
the explicit tradeoff of cost and performance) that is technically feasible. Line e in Figure 
16, is line d shifted to be tangent to the cost performance curve. 
The new framework allows the cost-performance trade-off to capture the temporal 
nature ofthe acquisition problem. This allows the user of the framework to maximize life 
cycle performance less cost, while achieving the level of performance at a specific time 
that is preferred. In order to accomplish this, several issues must be resolved including 
how the set level of performance is defined, when the level of performance will be 
achieved, the time weighted value of the migratory system performance capabilities, the 
likelihood ofbeing able to achieve this level of performance, and others. These questions 
will be answered within the confines of the framework. The problem answered by the new 
framework is maximize "life cycle performance" less "life cycle cost", subject to techno-
logical feasibility, and current systems and their capabilities. 
The framework will complete calculations based on a breakdown of the useful life 
of the system into time periods. The length of these time periods is at the discretion of the 
user. However, a few guidelines should be followed. The time periods should not be too 
short, as this will cause the number of calculations, estimations, and weights to become 
unmanageable. Likewise, time periods should not be too long, as this will cause cost 
estimations, discounting, and weighting to be less accurate, due for example to 
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technological change and economic change. For the illustrative examples provided, the 
assumed ten year useful life is broken down into ten, one year time periods. 
2. Overall Framework View 
The framework contains seven top level steps, each containing one or more sub-
steps. These seven steps are: 
1. Define the target and current systems, in terms of functions, capabilities, and useful 
life. 
2. Determine viable migratory paths from current or base systems to the target system. 
3. Develop and weigh the multiple measures of performance (MOP) for the card system, 
and calculate an overall MOP for each migration path, using the Analytical Hierarchy 
Process (AHP). 
4. Develop a hierarchical cost model for the card system, and calculate an overall life 
cycle cost for each migration path. 
5. Develop a preference for cost and performance, and use it to calculate an overall net 
value for each migration path. 
6. Develop a likelihood of occurrence for each migration path and select the migration 
path with the greatest expected value. 
7. Reevaluate and return to step one. 
Figure 17 provides a graphical summary of the steps in the new framework. The 
graphic representation of the framework shows the sequence of steps, as well as the recur-
sive nature of the framework. Steps three and four can be completed concurrently, 
however, they must be completed prior to step five. This overall view will be used to 
illustrate each of the steps throughout the new framework. 
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Establish Migratory Paths 
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Develop and Apply Develop and Apply 
Measures of Performance Hierarchical Cost Model 
~ / 
Calculate Overall Net Values 
, 
Select Migratory Path Based on 
Likelihood ofPath Occurrance 
,, 
Apply Selection, Periodically Review 
Figure 17-- The Steps of the New Framework 
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3. Framework Steps 
a. Define Cu"ent and Target Systems 
The first step in the framework is the definition of the current and target sys-
terns. Figure 18 summarizes this step. This step involves determining what functions are 
desired in the system that will eventually be, as well as what technological abilities the card 
Periodically Review 
Define Current and Target System 
- Determine Functions and 
Required Technical Capabilities 
of the Target System 
- Determine Current or Base 
System 
- Determine Current or Base 
Systems Life Expectancy 
Figure 18 --The New Framework- Step 1: Define Current and Target Systems 
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system must have in order to fill these functions. In addition, the decision maker must 
clearly define the base or current system. The target system definition must be based on a 
thorough review of needs. How this is accomplished is left to the user, however, there is 
considerable literature and DoD support for the development of mission needs statements, 
as well as total quality leadership guidance on reengineering processes. Whatever the sys-
tern used, the end product should be a clearly defined target system definition. This step 
also requires the decision maker to determine the life expectancy of the current system. 
(1) Determine Functions and Technical Capabilities. The target system must 
be clearly defined at the outset of the evaluation. This in effect sets the level of perform-
ance at the end of the planning horizon. Without a clearly defined target, it is impossible 
to complete the cost-benefit analysis. The target system is one which provides the antici-
pated level of functionality desired of the card system at some future point. To define this 
target system, a functionality versus technical capability table should be constructed. Each 
desired target system functionality will require the system to have one or more technical 
capabilities. Table 2 provides a sample card technology versus technical capability table. 
The table can be filled in using X's as required capabilities and O's as optional capabilities 
to support the function, or with numbers relating to the level of technical capability re-
quired (levels are discussed further under Step 3 and Appendix C), or with low (-), med-
ium (*), high ( +) indications. There has been work done on functionality versus techno-
logical capability tables for card technologies, and this work was used to create this table. 
2 
2 Bower, Leslie, "Automated Data Card Technologies: The Development ofFunc-
tionality and Application Matrices," Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, September 1994. 
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TABLE 2-- SAMPLE FUNCTIONALITY VERSUS TECHNICAL CAPABILITY 
Function s s B H A A c M D E E I T L 
t e i a c u r e a l l n i 0 
0 c 0 n c t y d t e e v m g 
r u m d e 0 p i a c c e e i 
e r e s s m t c t t n I s 
e t s a 0 a T r r t A t 
M r F t g l r 0 0 0 t i 
0 D i r c i r a n n r t c 
n a c e 0 c a R n i i y e s 
e t e n p e s c c n 
t a A t D h c f c d c 
a u 0 r a i 0 e c B 0 a 0 
r s t p 0 t c r r e e n n n 
y t h e I a d r n t c t 
0 e r c i t e r e r 
v r n a c a s n i f 0 0 
a a t t a p t f i I T I 
I g i i p a 0 E i t r 
u e c 0 t b r M c a 
e a n u I a I a X c 
t r e g t f k 
Technical i e e i e i 
Capability 
0 0 r n 
n n g 
Memory Capacity * + - * + * * * * 
Logic Capability X X X X 
Card Data Security + + + * - + * + + 
Error Detection + + * + + + + * * 
Passive Operation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Interactive Operation X X 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 X X 0 0 
Contactless Operation X 0 0 
EMI Resistant X 
Data Transfer Rate - * + * 
Data Transfer Distance - + + + 
(2) Determine Current and Base System. The current system is easily defined 
as those systems that are currently carrying out some or all of the functions which are to 
be automated through the use of a card technology. If no system is currently in use, or if 
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no reuse of the current system is possible, then base systems must be used. Base systems 
are those systems which can be purchased in the near term to automate some subset of the 
functions listed in the target system's functionality/technical capability table. All potential 
base systems which can be reasonably expected to someday obtain the level of functional-
ity desired in the target system, should be defined as alternate base systems. Base card 
systems are discrete alternatives, and can include any of the card technologies presented in 
Chapter III. 
(3) Determine Life Expectancy of Current or Base System. To apply the evo-
lutionary framework, a reasonable planning horizon must be selected, to provide the upper 
bounds for the calculations of cost and performance. The card system analysis planning 
horizon used should be the same as the planning horizon used by the entity as a whole. 
What planning horizon an entity should use has many factors to it, including the ability to 
forecast, and interest rates, and is beyond the scope of this thesis. The planning horizon of 
the organization may be longer or shorter than the life expectancy of the card system to be 
procured. If it is shorter, follow on card systems must be included in the evaluation to 
bring life expectancy equal to or greater than the organization's planning horizon. If the 
life expectancy of the system is greater than the planning horizon, some valuation of scrap 
or residual value at the end ofthe planning horizon must be made. If this is not possible, 
than a list of available assets, human knowledge, as well as physical is made. The life 
expectancy is usually limited by the life expectancy of major system hardware components. 
With card technology systems, the major hardware item used is the card reader or 
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acceptor device. Since these card readers are mechanical devices, a life expectancy is fair-
ly easy to determine. Data on the mean time to failure (MTF) for the various card readers 
are available from both manufacturers and independent testing agencies. In the illustrative 
examples given in this chapter, a ten year planning horizon will be assumed. 
b. Establish Migratory Paths 
Once the target system, base or current system, and life expectancy have been 
determined, the next step is the establishment of potential migratory paths (MPs) from the 
base systems to the target system. Figure 19 summarizes this step. 




Establish Migratory Paths 
- List Current or Base Systems 
-List Target System 
- Establish Viable Migration 
Paths From Current or 
Base System to Target System 
Figure 19 --The New Framework- Step 2: Establish Migratory Paths 
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( 1) List Current or Base Systems. The first sub-step is to identifY assets and 
systems being used to currently carry out the functions to be automated. From this identi-
fication of assets, some reuse may be possible. As was discussed earlier, current or base 
systems may already be in place, may already be procured but not yet in place, or may not 
have been procured yet, but available in the near term. 
(2) List Target System Attributes. From the target system functionality and 
required technological capabilities identified in step one, a clear picture of the target sys-
tem's attributes can be established. The form of this target system attribute list is unimpor-
tant, as long as the decision maker(s) have a clear vision of the target system they desire to 
migrate toward. 
(3) Construct Viable Paths to Target System. The construction of these 
migration paths require considerable analysis. Migration paths represent all of the possible 
paths by which the user could get from the current or base system to the target system. 
Each of these migration paths may be a different technology, or may be the same technol-
ogy applied differently. The construction of migratory paths can use several sources for 
information. Expert consultants in the field of card technology can be used to provide in-
formation on future technology and migration path alternatives. Vendors of card technol-
ogies can also provide data of future upgrades expected in technology technology. Trade 
shows, such as the CardTech/SecurTech conference held in the spring in Washington, 
D.C., are also excellent sources of information. Unfortunately, there are few books on the 
subject. The CardTech/SecurTech conference proceedings are a useful source. 
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Because the target system may have some functionality which is not currently 
available, the establishment of these migration paths frequently involve technological fore-
casting. Figure 20 shows the relationship between current or base systems, target sys-
terns, and possible migratory paths. Curves A, B, C, D, and E are migration paths from 
the current or base system to the target system. Migration path E also shows two way-
points M and N. Waypoints are major milestones in the system's life cycle. They can be 
major system changes, integration of major legacy systems into the new system, required 
technological advances, or any other intermediate goal on the way to the target system. 












Figure 20 -- Migration Paths 
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Target 
8 9 10 
______________________________________________ ___. 
c. Develop and Apply Measures of Performance 
The third step in the new framework is to develop and apply measures of per-
formance to the target system and migratory paths established in steps one and two. 
Figure 21 summarizes this step. This step has several sub-steps, each ofwhich is dis-
cussed below. 
Defme Current and 
Target Systems 
Select Migratory Path Based on 




Develop and Apply 
Measures of Performance 
Deyelon 
- Decide on Important 
Performance Attributes 
-Use AHP to Weigh the 
Importance of Each 
Alul!I 
-Calculate Aggregate MOP 
for Each Period 
-Use AHP to Determine Time 
Preference of Performance 
- Calculate Overall Time 
Weighted MOP for Each 
Migration Path 
'----------------------' 
Figure 21 -- The New Framework- Step 3: Develop and Apply MOP 
(1) Determine Performance Attributes and Scales. Before measures of per-
formance can be determined for the various migration paths, a list of performance 
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attributes that will be used to evaluate the systems must be generated. The list of 
performance attributes to be used should be as comprehensive as possible, and at this 
point the user should not be concerned with how performance will be measured, how im-
portant the performance attribute is, or any other application concern. The goal of the 
first part of this sub-step is to produce a comprehensive list of performance attributes. 
Once the list of performance attributes is established, it is helpful to graphically 
represent it in hierarchy form. This allows the grouping of some of the finer performance 
attributes into larger categories. Figure 22 provides a sample measure of performance 
hierarchy. The user ofthis framework may generate their own MOP hierarchy, or may 
apply the provided one to their problem. The reader will notice the category labeled 
Application Specific MOP, provided as a convenient place to add performance measures 
unique to their problem. 
The final part of this sub-step is to determine a scale for each of the major 
categories of performance. The scale provides an indication of the possible range of the 
performance attributes. The scale should range from currently available, inexpensive 
capabilities to not yet available, visionary capabilities. These scales may be linear or loga-
rithmic and may use any number of entries. As can be seen in Figure 22, each of the mea-
sure of performance categories can be broken down into multiple components. These 
components are the major determinants of that category's performance. A sample scale, 
for the performance attribute Interface Robustness is provided below. A linear, 1-10 scale 
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major determinants the robustness of the interface between the card and reader are: Dis-
tance of interface, speed of data transfer, card insertion or orientation requirements or 
speed of travel allowances, line of sight requirements, and electro-magnetic interference 
(EMI) resistance. 
Interface Robustness Scale: 
1 Contact interface, slow data transfer rates, insertion, EMI resistant 
(e.g., contact ICC) 
2 - Contact interface, high data transfer rates, insertion, EMI resistant 
(e.g., optical memory cards) 
3 - Slot operation contactless, low data transfer rates, requires card orientation 
(e.g., Wlegand~ Bar Code) 
4 - Proximity, low data transfer rates, requires card orientation, non-EMI resistant, 
LOS required (e.g. inductively powered proximity) 
5 - Proximity, low data transfer rates, no card orientation, non-EMI resistant, LOS 
required (e.g., battery powered proximity) 
6 - Few to several feet, medium d.ata transfer mtes, ~ow speed of card travel, 
non-EMI resistant, LOS required (e.g., battery powered radio frequency card) 
7 - Several feet, medium data transfer rate, medium speed of card travel, non-EMI 
resistant, LOS required (in development) 
8 - Few Feet, high rate of data transfer, high speed of card travel, EMI resistant, 
LOS required (not available presently) 
9 - Tens of feet, high rate of data transfer, high speed of card travel, EMI 
resistant, LOS required (not available presently) 
10 - Tens offeet, high rate oftransfer, high speed of card travel, EMI resistant, no 
LOS requirement (not available presently) 
135 
Similar scales for the other non-measurable attributes could be developed. A 
performance scale for more measurable attributes, such as memory capacity, could be 
placed on a logarithmic scale of amount of bytes of data. Sample scales for some of these 
attributes are included in Appendix C. 
(2) Use AHP to Develop an Aggregate Measure of Performance (MOP). 
Once the measure of performance scales have been developed, the next step is to weigh 
the importance of each of the measures of performance. While this could be done a num-
ber of ways, AHP was determined, by the author, to be the most appropriate. Using the 
AHP's pairwise comparisons, a relative weight of the importance of each category can be 
obtained. While it would be possible to use AHP to weigh each of the performance attrib-
utes identified, doing so could become extremely involved. If that were done, than the 
weighting of the individual performance attribute would be the sum ofthe weights of the 
categories it is in. For example, in the sample MOP hierarchy in Figure 22, if the Security 
category were weighted 0.4, and the Card, User, FAR, and FRR sub-categories each 
weighted 0.5, then the Weight for FRR by itselfwould be 0.4 x 0.5 x 0.5 = 0.1. 
(3) Calculate the Aggregate MOP for Each Period. Once the MOP weights 
have been established for the categories, the aggregate MOP for each time period in the 
useful life of the system must be calculated. This is accomplished by multiplying thecate-
gory scale achieved by the system during that period by the weight for that category. In 
this manner, the user calculates an aggregate MOP for each period in the useful life. 
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(4) Use AHP to Develop the Time Preference ofPerformance. The next sub-
step in this step is to determine the time preference for the aggregate MOP. Again, AHP 
was chosen for consistency and ease of use. An AHP pairwise comparison of each of the 
periods in the useful life of the system are compared in order to determine the weighting 
for each period. A word of caution is appropriate here. In order to simplify the problem 
into a linear one, the new framework has the user only weigh the time preference for the 
entire measure of performance. While it is possible to time preference weigh each of the 
individual categories of performance, or even each of the individual MOP elements, this 
would greatly complicate the problem and make it non-linear. While this is a limitation of 
the framework, it greatly simplifies the problem, and is deemed by the author not to be a 
significant source of error, in light of the gain in simplification. 
(5) Calculate Overall Time Weighted MOP for Each Migration Path. The final 
sub-step in this step is to use the time preference weights to determine an overall time 
weighted MOP figure for each of the migration paths identified in step two. This is 
accomplished by multiplying the MOP for all the periods in the useful life, by the time 
preference weight for that period, and then summing the resultants. This gives a single 
time weighted MOP for the migration path. This is likewise done for each migration path. 
d. Develop and Apply Hierarchical Cost Model 
The fourth step in the new framework is to develop and apply a hierarchical 
cost model to the target system and migratory paths established in steps one and two. 
Figure 23 summarizes this step. 
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Figure 23-- The New Framework- Step 4: Develop and Apply Cost Model 
(1) Determine Cost Element Drivers. Before a cost model can be developed 
for the various migration paths, a list of cost element drivers for the card system must be 
identified. Like the list of performance attributes, this list should be as comprehensive as 
possible, and at this point the user should not be concerned with how the cost will be 
determined, how important the cost element is, or any other application concern. The 
goal of the first part of this sub-step is produce a comprehensive as possible list of cost 
elements. 
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(2) Develop Hierarchical Cost Model. Once the list of cost elements is estab-
lished, it is helpful to graphically represent it in hierarchy form. This allows the grouping 
of some of the smaller cost elements into larger categories. Figure 24 provides a sample 
cost hierarchy. The user of this framework may generate their own cost hierarchy, or may 
apply the provided one to their problem. The reader will notice the category labeled 
Application Specific Cost, provided as a convenient place to add costs unique to their 
problem, including possible scrap values for previous system components. 
(3) Calculate Costs for Each Period (Economic Forecasting as Necessary). 
The next sub-step is to apply this cost model to calculate the cost for each period in the 
useful life of the system. As was discussed in Chapter V, many things must be taken into 
account when determining the expected costs, especially in forecasting future costs. 
(4) Discount Costs to Obtain the Present Value of Life Cycle Cost. Each of 
the period costs obtained in the previous sub-step's calculations, need to be discounted to 
obtain the present value of these costs. Discounting these costs, as was discussed in 
Chapter V, involves a trivial calculation. Present value costs must be compared in order 
to obtain the time weighted costs of the system. 
(5) Calculate Present Value Life Cycle Cost for Each Migration Path. The 
final sub-step in this step is to calculate the overall present value life cycle costs for each 
migration path identified in step two. This value is simply the sum of all of the present 
value costs for each period in the useful life. Once this figure has been obtained, it is time 
to go on to the next step in the framework. 
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e. Calculate Overall Net Values 
The fifth step in the framework is to calculate the overall net values of each 
migration path identified in step two. Figure 25 summarizes this step. This step has two 
sub-steps which are described below. 
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Figure 25 --The New Framework- Step 5: Calculate Overall Net Values 
(1) Use AHP to Develop MOP and Life Cycle Cost Preferences. The first 
sub-step involves determining the preference between cost and performance. As with any 
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cost-benefit analysis, a tradeoffbetween cost and performance must be made. AHP was 
again chosen as tool to weigh these preferences. 
(2) Calculate Overall Net Values for Each Migration Path. After the cost and 
performance preference weights have been determined, the overall net value for each 
migration path can be determined. This is done using each migration path's time weighted 
MOP and present value life cycle costs, and multiplying them by their respective 
preference weight. While these numbers could be compared directly, a more intuitive 
comparison is possible be scaling one of the two figures to be of the same magnitude. 
This can be accomplished in one of two ways; scaling the measures of performance up 
from the double digits they are in, to the order of magnitude the costs are in, or scaling the 
costs down to the double digits the measures of performance are in. Using the first 
alternative, the user is then trading single dollars for very small (0.00001 on a million 
dollar system) increases in performance. The author found the later choice to be easier to 
conceptualize. If the present value costs for the system are in the tens of millions of 
dollars, the present value costs should be divided by one million before multiplying by the 
cost preference weight. The user will then have to remember that they are now trading 
millions of dollars for one unit increase in performance. After multiplication by their 
respective preference weights the value for cost is subtracted from the value for 
performance. The result is the overall net value for the migration path. This number may 
be negative or positive, depending on the values obtained for performance, the scaling 
used, and the preferences used. In either case, the larger the number the better the choice. 
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f. Select Migratory Path 
The sixth step in the new framework is the selection of the migratory path. 
Figure 26 provides a summary of this step. This step contains three sub-steps which are 
described below. 
Defme Current and 
Target Systems 
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- Select Migratory Path with 
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Figure 26 --The New Framework- Step 6: Select Migratory Path 
(1) Use Risk Analysis to Determine Likelihood ofPath Occurrence. Since 
each of the migratory paths have some forecasting of future technological capabilities, 
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there is a likelihood of path occurrence associated with each path. The determination of 
these likelihood of path occurrences requires use of risk analysis as discussed in 
Chapter V. These likelihood's should be expressed as percentages, and do not need to add 
to one, however, they are more easily understood if normalized to add to one. 
(2) Calculate Net Expected Value for Each Migration Path. Once the values 
for likelihood of path occurrence has been determined for each migration path identified in 
step two, the net expected value for the path can be determined. This is accomplished by 
multiplying the overall net values obtained in step five by the respective likelihood of 
occurrence value. In this manner, a net expected value, including consideration of the 
risk, is obtained for each migration path. 
(3) Select Path with Greatest Net Expected Value. The net expected values 
calculated above are used to select the best solution to the problem. The path with the 
greatest net expected value, is the most appropriate solution to the problem, taking into 
account performance, cost, time, and technological risk. 
g. Apply Selection and Reevaluate 
The final step in the framework is the application and reevaluation of the 
selection. Figure 27 provides a summary of this step. The two sub-steps are described 
below. 
( 1) Initiate System Procurement. The first sub-step, is to initiate system 
procurement. Once the card technology selection has been made, the system must be 
defined, procured, installed, and operated. This paper does not discuss the procurement 
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of card technology systems in detail, however, it is worthwhile to remind the reader that 
there are many unique aspects of evolutionary system acquisition. 
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Figure 27 --The New Framework- Step 7: Apply Selection, Periodically Review 
(2) Reevaluate New State Using Framework Steps. The new framework is 
recursive in nature, and the card technology decision should be periodically reviewed. 
These reviews should occur whenever any of the following occur; new data about cost or 
performance is received, waypoints on migration path are reached (whether achieved or 
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not), difficulties arise in achieving projected functionality, or any time the migration plan 
changes. This is a crucial aspect of the new framework, as the framework is designed to 
be a continued evaluation tool, and not just an initial decision tool. 
C.FRAMEWORKSUMMARY 
The new framework presented in this chapter, provides the decision maker(s) with 
a functionally-oriented, capabilities-based approach to card technology systems analysis. 
Figure 28 provides summary of the decision tree for the new framework, complete with 
where the weights are applied. Appendix D provides an illustrative application of the new 
framework to an evolutionary card technology system. 
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See Figure 22 --MOP Hierarchy 
Figure 28-- The New Framework Decision Hierarchy 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
Chapter II presented a discussion of the 12 performance issues associated with card 
technology and authentication scheme selection. Available card technologies were 
presented in Chapter III, including the history, application, and uses of the technology. 
Authentication techniques were presented in Chapter IV, along with a discussion of 
authentication, identification, and error rates in general. Chapter V presented the DoD's 
view of and support for concepts used within the new framework, as well as a discussion 
of tools and theories employed within the framework. The new framework that focuses 
the evaluation of alternatives on their evolutionary upgrade paths was presented in 
Chapter VI. The framework presents a method that could be useful to decision makers in 
choosing between alternate card technology and authentication technique systems. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The following conclusions can be made in regard to card technology systems: 
1. That card technology systems must capitalize on emerging technologies to gain the 
most benefit from technology. 
2. That card technology systems can incorporate evolutionary upgrades throughout their 
useful life cycle, if procured through evolutionary acquisition. 
3. The temporal component of card technology system procurement is an often 
overlooked aspect. 
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The new framework presented here offers an alternate approach to card system 
evaluations. The framework's methods for dealing with upgrade paths can be applied to 
any evolutionary system acquisition. Card technology systems will continue to change 
rapidly to keep up with state-of-the-art technology and security threats. This aspect, 
called the temporal component, must be evaluated by a system evaluation methodology. 
This framework accomplishes this. The author concludes that evaluations of alternatives 
can be based on cost/benefit analysis performed on the perceived future upgrade path 
alternatives. 
While several different people using the same information and the new framework to 
the same problem, may come out with diverse results. However, it is the author's belief 
that the magnitudes will not significantly differ. The framework provides the user with a 
qualitative cost/benefit analysis of the perceived future upgrade path alternatives. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
This framework represents an initial effort at basing the evaluation of alternative card 
technology systems on their future evolutionary upgrade paths. General concepts and 
procedures were introduced and applied to the card technology selection problem. Areas 
that could benefit from further research include: 
1. More streamlined methods for determining target system functions and capabilities. 
2. Methods that more accurately predict future upgrade technological capabilities and 
costs. 
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3. Methods that would more accurately evaluate the uncertainty and risk associated with 
migration path selection. 
4. A more generic representation of the framework which could be applied to a variety 





















APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 
Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene 
Access Control System 
Analytic Hierarchy Process 
Automated Information System 
Automated Information Technology 
American National Standards Committee 
American National Standards Institute 
Automatic Teller Machine 
Business Process Improvement or 
Bits Per Inch 
Business Process Redesign 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers and 
Intelligence 
Card Acceptor Device 
Card Coupling Device 
Corporate Information Management 
Chip Operating System 
Commercial-off-the-Shelf 
Central Processing Unit 
Data Encryption Algorithm 
























Directly Read After Writing 
Digital Signature Algorithm 
Digital Signature Standard 
Electronic Benefits Transfer 
Electronically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory 
Electronic Funds Transfer 
Electro-magnetic 
Electro-magnetic Interference 
Electronically Programmable Read-Only Memory 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
False Acceptance Rate (type I error rate) 
False Rejection Rate (type II error rate) 
Financial Transaction Card (credit card) 
Government -off-the-Shelf 
High Coercivity (magnetic material) 
Integrated Circuit 
Integrated Circuit Card 
International Association for Microcircuit Card 
Input I Output 

























Information Technology Policy Board 
Japan Electronic Industry Development Association 
Japan IC Card Application Council 
Kilo-byte (thousands of bytes) 
Low Coercivity (magnetic material) 
Line of Sight 
Mega-byte (millions ofbytes) 
Memory Chip Card 
Multi-application Chip Operating System 
Magnetic Ink Character Recognition 
Measure of Performance 
National Institute of Standards and Technology 
Optical Character Recognition (or Reader) 
Optical Memory Card 
Operating System 
Open System Interconnection 
Personal Computer 
Personal Computer Memory Card International Association 
3.3 mm thick 
5.0 mm thick (slots will accept Type I also) 
10.5 mm thick (slots will accept Type I or II also) 
15-18 mm thick in development, Toshiba proprietary 

















Personal Identification Verification 
Point Of Sale 
Programmable Read-Only Memory 
Programmable Security Code 
Present Value 
Poly Vinyl Chloride 
Poly Vinyl Chloride Acetate 
Random Access Memory 
Radio Frequency 
Radio Frequency Identification 
Read-Only Memory 
Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (algorithm for encryption) 
Token-Based Access Control Systems 
Universal Product Code 












APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Acrylonitrile Butadiene Styrene - Plastic material frequently 
employed for injection molded cards. 
A cryptographic authentication technique in which the prover and 
verifier keys are different. Also called public and private key 
systems. Examples include RSA and DSS. 
The verification of a person or cards identity, given a claimed 
identity and an authentication measure. System matches input 
authentication against a stored reference for claimed identity to 
validate. 
A series of vertical bars that contrast with the background. Usually 
black on white. These bars and spaces of specific widths are 
arranged in a unique sequential pattern to represent binary data. 
BaFe, permanent magnetic material "Read Only" placed in a card to 
form a binary code. Usually access control and financial transaction 
cards. A Hi Co material.. 
A method of using a permanent human attribute, physical or 
behavioral, for identification purposes. Example, fingerprints, 
voiceprints, eye retina patterns, hand geometry, and DNA 
A unit of information having only one of two values, a zero or a 
one. The units are used in combination to express information such 
as characters or digits. 
A combination ofbits (usually 8 to 10) that defines the 
representation of a set of characters or symbols. 
Card Acceptor Device - a card reader for contact type cards, such 
as contact IC cards. 
Card Coupling Device - a card reader for non-contact cards, such 
as proximity cards, RF/ID cards, and contactless IC cards. 
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Challenge-Response A process where the verifier sends a value (challenge) to the 
prover, and expects a certain return value or information that is 
used to verify the authenticity of the prover. 
Character An alphabetic or numeric symbol. 
Chip A small square of thin, semiconductor material, such as silicon, that 
has been chemically processed to have a specific set of electrical 
characteristics such as circuits, storage, and/or logic elements. 
Coercive Force The energy required to saturate a given piece of magnetic material. 
Expressed in "Oersteds". 
Coercivity The magnetic "retention value" of different ferrous oxide materials. 
For example a high coercivity stripe will be less vulnerable to 
degaussing or erasure than a low coercivity stripe. 
Contact An electrical connecting surface between a Smart Card and its 
interfacing device that permits a flow of current. 
Contactless A connection between a Smart Card and its interfacing device that 
does not use a contact surface. In these devices a flow of current 







Data Encryption Algorithm - An encryption process that is a United 
States national standard, an ANSC national standard and a financial 
industry standard. The process is key-driven and reversible. 
Data Encryption Standard - a public domain encryption algorithm. 
A medium designed for a specific period or amount ofuse, such as 
the number of trips or telephone calls, after which the card no 
longer has any value and may be discarded. 
Digital Signature Standard - An asymmetric key encryption 
standard widely used in the United States. 
Electronically erasable, programmable, read-only memory. Chip 













A method of "striking" raised characters on plastic or metal. A 
male and female die set literally "squeeze" the material into a 
character shape. 
Converting clear or plain text to scrambled test with the use of a 
key driven algorithm. 
Electronically programmable, read-only memory. A semiconductor 
memory that is erasable with ultra-violet light. This is nonvolatile 
memory. 
False Acceptance Rate - the average percentage of occurrence of 
false acceptance, authenticating a non-authentic prover. Also called 
type II error. 
False Rejection Rate- the average percentage occurrence of 
rejection of an authentic user. Also called a type I error. 
The metal "rust" particles that are used to make magnetic stripes. 
The controlled rusting (oxidation) determines the recording 
characteristics of the magnetic material. Also called Iron Oxide 
(Fe20 3) and is the most common LoCo material. 
High Coercivity - magnetic material which has properties allowing 
it to retain a greater amount of magnetic storage than LoCo 
material. Barium Ferrite (BaFe) most commonly used. 
Unique photo/graphic printing that gives the image a three 
dimensional effect. Usually employed for security or aesthetic 
effect. 
A method of encoding that embodies a three dimensional binary bit 
that is recognized a special reader. 
The verification of identity given only the authentication method 
(no claimed identity). Much more difficult problem than 
authentication. System attempts to match input authentication with 
entire database of stored reference data. 
Integrated Circuit Cards - a variety of different card types, all 














A biometric authentication or identification technique in which the 
unique pattern of the iris of the eye is observed and recorded by a 
camera in the verifier. 
Low Coercivity - magnetic material which retains a lower amount 
of magnetic data than HiCo material. Iron Oxide (Fe20 3) most 
commonly used. 
Line of Sight - a direct, unobstructed path between the card 
acceptor device and the card itself. 
Optical Character Recognition - Character fonts that are 
machine-readable by optical techniques. 
A unit of magnetic coercive force. Also used to define relative 
magnetic material "energy retention value". 
Optical Memory Card - a card technology that uses optical media 
placed on the card to store data. 
Open System Interconnection - An international standard for 
describing the interaction of computer systems through 
communications link characteristics by allocating the information 
functions into seven distinct layers. 
A person or entity that is attempting to prove that it is a member in 
the system. 
A "non contact" system for reading cards. Data is exchanged 
between card and reader by Radio Frequency, Fiber Optics, 
Magnetic Induction, Laser or other non-mechanical contact 
technology. 
Poly Vinyl Chloride - A material that is most frequently used in the 
manufacture of credit and I.D. cards. PVC has certain attributes 
that allow it to retain embossing. It is easily printable and will 
laminate at moderate temperatures. 
A PIV technique based on an infrared scan of the eye retina. 
Radio Frequency that is used for a card to communicate with a 
reader in a "proximity" or "non-contact" system. 
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RSA Rivest Shamir Adelman - an asymmetric key authentication scheme 
widely used in the United States. 
Symmetric Key A cryptographic authentication method where the key used for 
verifying is identical to the key used to generate the proof 
Example is DES. 
Verifier An entity in the system that carries out the identification or 
authentication of the prover, and determines the authentication of 
the prover. 
Voice Recognition An authentication or identification technique which uses the unique 
flex, pitch, speed and other characteristics of voice to determine the 
authenticity ofthe prover. 
WORM Write Once Read Many - a memory type that is not re-writable. 
Zero Knowledge A challenge and response authentication protocol where the verifier 
is able to deduce that the prover holds the secret information, 
without having any knowledge of the secret information. 
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APPENDIX C: PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTES SCALE 
This appendix is intended to give the reader some additional sample performance 
attribute scales. These performance attribute scales are for the large categories of 
performance indicators provided in the sample measure of performance hierarchy in Figure 
22. These large categories often encompass several aspects of card technology selection, 
and a performance attribute scale could be developed for each ofthe low level aspects. 
For purpose of illustration here, scales were developed for the large categories only, and 
the lower level aspects were used in the description of the level of performance. 1 
Security Level 
The security level consists of two parts, user and token authentication. The MOP 
scale will be the average of the values obtained for each 





5 Knowledge Challenge and Response 
6 Combination Token and Knowledge 
7 Behavioral Characteristic 
8 Biometric Characteristic 
9 Combination Knowledge and Characteristic 
10 Characteristic Challenge and Response 
Token Authentication: 
1 none 
2 Card size check 
3 Card type check 
4 Card knowledge (permanent) check (e.g. Wiegand) 
5 Limited OS, data storage check 
6 Encoded data only 
7 Logic capable challenge and response 
8 Full OS, data storage validation (logic capable) 
9 Full cryptographic capable OS validation 
10 Full cryptographic capable, interrogation exchange (card validates reader 
as well) 
1 Additional information on card technologies functionality matrix can be found in 
Bower, Leslie, "Automated Data Card Technologies: The Development ofFunctionality 
and Application Matrices, Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, September 1994. 
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User Acceptance: (fear oftechnology, fear ofbodily damage, ease ofuse, fear of misuse) 
1 Extremely Low - High fear levels, hard to use 
2 
3 Low - Moderate fear levels, not easy to use 
4 
5 Medium- Moderate fear levels, moderate ease of use 
6 
7 Medium High - Lower fear levels, fairly easy to use 
8 
9 High - Low fear levels, easy to use 
10 Extremely High- No fear, easy to use 
Memory (size, speed, life) 
1 Low capacity(< 1 KB), slow transfer, short life (years) (e.g. magnetic 
stripe) 
2 
3 Moderate capacity (1 OO's ofKB), medium transfer rates, life in decades 
4 
5 Average capacity(> I KB, < 1 MB), medium transfer rates, life in decades 
6 
7 
8 High capacity(> 1 MB), fast transfer rates, extremely long life(> 20 years) 
9 
10 Very high capacity(> 100MB), fast transfer, unlimited life 
Durability: 
1 Poor- Easily damaged by multiple common items (such as water) 
2 
3 Fair- Fairly good durability against common handling, poor resistance to 
mishandling 
4 
5 Moderate - Good durability in common handling, resistant to abuse 
6 
7 Good - Very good durability in common handling, good resistance to abuse 
8 
9 Very good - Undamagable in normal handling, Very resistant to any 
damage 




This measure of performance is more subjective than many of the other measures. 
A simple scale of 1-10 was developed and text description applied. 
1 Poor - difficult to upgrade and expand 
2 
3 Fair- not easy to upgrade and expand 
4 
5 Moderately easy to upgrade and expand 
6 
7 
8 Good - easy to upgrade and expand 
9 
10 Excellent - easily upgraded and expanded 
Processing Ability 
This consists of several indicators, speed of processing (MIPS), error detection, 
level of processing difficulty, operating system robustness and others. 
1 No processing ability 
2 Very limited processing ability - simple calculations and the like 
3 
4 
5 Moderate- some processing ability (COS), low speed (1-10 !\1Hz) 
6 Average- advanced operating system (MCOS), low speed (1-10 !\1Hz) 
7 Good- advanced operating system, moderate speed (10-50 !\1Hz) 
8 
9 
1 0 Excellent, very high speed processing, complete sophisticated operating 
system, high speed (50-100 !\1Hz) 
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APPENDIX D: ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE 
This appendix is intended to give the reader a sample application of the framework 
steps in order to illustrate the steps of the new framework. 
Step 1: Define Current and Target Systems 
For this illustration a fairly simple target system was chosen in order to 
demonstrate the framework steps most clearly and not get the reader wrapped up in the 
technology considerations, nuances, and discussions of what is or is not yet possible in 
card technology systems. The target system is to be an organization wide access control 
system for installations, buildings, rooms, and computer systems. It is to be multi-
biometric capable, and be able to carry out authentication and identification. It is to allow 
hands free operation and support a high speed of card travel (as in a vehicle). At this 
point a more in-depth analysis of the needs would be conducted, and a table of 
functionality versus technical capability, similar to Table 2, would be constructed. The 
current system would be analyzed as well. For simplicity, the current system oflocks, 
guards, and manual access control measures were determined to be the base system. A 
planning horizon of 10 years was chosen to match that of the organization. 
Step 2: Establish Migratory Paths 
In-depth research would be required to establish viable migration paths toward the 
target system. However, a few possible migratory paths can be assumed. There are 
several waypoints possible in the migration toward the described system. The migration 
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breaks down into three major segments. In order of ease of solutions they are, the control 
of access to buildings and rooms, the control of access to computer systems, and the 
control of access to installations. Card systems to control access to buildings and rooms, 
is a well established, well vendor supported area with many technology choices. 
Computer system control is less well established, however, there is considerable work 
being done in this field, and many of the same building access control technologies may be 
used. Mass vehicle access control to installations is not as common an application. Most 
installation access control system use similar technology to a building access control 
where a card is inserted, verified and a door or gate is opened to allow one individual or 
vehicle to pass. This is insufficient for control of mass access to an instillation. 
The first migratory path to be developed is a contactless programmable IC card 
system. These systems support many of the first segment's goals of room and building 
access. A system could be procured in the near term using contactless chip card system to 
handle most of these requirements. Access to computer systems using this system is 
possible in the near future as well. The use of contactless chip card systems for higher 
speed vehicle access control has not been proven as yet, however, this is a viable 
migratory path to assume it someday will be possible. 
Another possible migratory path is a Wiegand technology based system. While 
Wiegand cards are not capable of the storage required to carry out stand alone biometric 
authentication, they could rely on a central database for all the access control information, 
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and just be used as an automatic data capture device. Again, if vehicle access control at 
speed is possible with Wiegand technology remains to be seen. 
A third possible choice is some form ofRFIID or contactless memory only IC card 
system. This system would function using the data stored on the card as the reference 
data for authentication, and could support a decentralized system. This technology is 
being tested for use in automated toll collection and the like and appears promising to be 
able to carryout vehicle identification at speed. 
Many other migratory paths could be developed, and a much more in-depth 
analysis of potential migratory paths would be required. However, these paths will be 
sufficient for an illustration of the framework. 
Step 3: Develop and Apply Measures of Performance 
The development and application of a measure of performance (MOP) hierarchy 
would be required next. The MOP hierarchy provided in the discussion of the new 
framework (Figure 22) will be used for this illustrative example as well. The next sub-step 
after developing the hierarchy is to weigh the importance of each MOP category. The 
development of a complete AHP analysis and weighing of the eight performance 
categories would be required. The complete pairwise comparisons required for these 
eight categories would not be a trivial item. In most cases a software package, such as 
Expert Choice by Decision Support Software, would be utilized. However, a sample of 
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the AHP pairwise comparisons and numerical ratings required is provided below to 
familiarize the user with the process. 
The AHP can be used for weighing many different preference measures. It can be 
used for weighing the preference between two systems in terms of an attribute, or for 
weighing the importance of the attributes themselves. The standard AHP numerical rating 
scheme provided below is geared toward the weighing of preferences between two 
systems. Substituting the concept of importance for word preference below, gives a rating 
scale for the comparison of categories of performance. 
Verbal Judgment ofPreference 
Extremely Preferred 
Very Strongly to extremely 
Very Strongly Preferred 
Strongly to very strongly 
Strongly Preferred 
Moderately to strongly 
Moderately preferred 












To apply the AHP rating scale, each of the performance categories needs to be compared 
with each of the other categories. The first step is to define the goal ofusing the AHP. 
Goal: SELECT THE BEST ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM 
With respect to the goal, comparing INTERFACE ROBUSTNESS to MEMORY 
is INTERFACE ROBUSTNESS 
Extremely Preferred 9 
Very Strongly to extremely 8 
Very Strongly Preferred 7 
Strongly to very strongly 6 
166 
Strongly Preferred 
Moderately to strongly 
Moderately preferred 








This process would be continued until each of the categories were compared to 
each of the other categories. The result of these comparisons would be an eight by eight 
matrix of performance criteria preference (or importance). Using some mathematical 
manipulation, (carried out by the software package in this case) the matrix can be 
normalized and checked for consistency. The result is relative weights of importance of 
the eight performance criteria. For this illustration, the obtained weights for the 
















. 000 (no application specific MOPs) 
1.000 
The next sub-step is to calculate the aggregate MOP for each period. For this 
illustrative example, the planning horizon of 10 years was broken down into five two year 
periods. (periods of one year or 18 months could have been used, however this would 
have greatly expanded the size of the illustration). For each period and for each migration 
path, an aggregate MOP must be calculated. Using the MOP scales presented in Chapter 
VI and Appendix C, a value for MOP is calculated for each period. For example, for 
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contactless programmable IC card system (battery powered cards), period I, the MOP 
would look like: 





User Acceptance 4 
Scalibility/Expandability 6 
Application Specific MOP .Q_ (no application specific MOPs) 
38 
This would be completed for the programmable IC card system forecasted for 
periods II through Vas well. The illustrative values for these periods are 46, 53, 61, and 
69 respectively. This process would then be accomplished for the other migration paths as 
well. 
The next sub-step would be to develop the time preference for performance. This 
is accomplished using AHP. As discussed in Chapter VI, this time preference is for the 
entire MOP, and not each individual category in the MOP. The AHP preference weights 
for each time period would be calculated using the same AHP described above. The 














The next step is to calculate the overall time weighted MOP for each migration 
path. This is accomplished by multiplying the time period MOPs by the time period 
preferences. For the programmable IC card system this would be: 
Time Period Preference Weight MOP Time Weighted MOP 
I 0.30 38 11.40 
II 0.22 46 10.12 
III 0.18 53 9.54 
IV 0.15 61 9.15 
v 0.15 69 10.35 
50.56 
This would then be accomplished for each of the different migration paths. 
Step 4: Develop and Apply Hierarchical Cost Model 
A sample cost model was provided in Chapter VI, and will be used for this 
illustrative example as well. The determination of the costs of the system is unique to each 
individual procurement, and presenting an in-depth cost estimation at this point would be 
oflimited use. The illustrative costs for each period for the contactless programmable IC 






















The present value costs for each migration path would be likewise calculated. 
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Step 5: Calculate Overall Net Values 
To complete this step, a preference weighting between cost and performance must 
first be calculated. This is accomplished using AHP to compare the preference for cost 
versus performance. For this illustrative example, a 0.60 weighting is used for cost, and a 
0. 40 weighting is used for performance. 
The next step is to obtain the overall net values for each migration path. As 
discussed in Chapter VI, this is accomplished by multiplying the MOP and cost numbers 
by their respective weights. For ease of understanding, the cost figure in this case is 
scaled to millions of dollars. There for the overall net value for the programmable 
contactless IC card system would be: 50.56 * (0.4)- 47.87 * (0.6) =- 8.498 
The overall net values for each ofthe other migration paths would be similarly 
calculated. The reader will note that the number obtained for the overall net value is 
negative. It may be positive or negative, depending on the figures obtained in the 
calculation, but in either case, the objective will be to obtain the largest number. That is 
either the smallest negative number, or the largest positive number. 
Step 6: Select Migratory Path 
The final calculation required is the determination oflikelihood of path occurrence. 
This can be accomplished using AHP as discussed above and determining the relative 
likelihood of path occurrence, or by doing risk analysis and determining an actual figure 
(percentage) for the likelihood of path occurrence. Using risk analysis and normalizing the 
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resultant percentages to add to one, will provide similar figures to work with as the AHP 
results. Using these figures, a net expected value for each migration path is calculated. 
For example, if the likelihood of the programmable contactless IC card system reaching 
the target functionality is determined to be 0.54, the net expected value of that migration 
path would be- 8.498 * 0.54 =- 4.59. The net expected values obtained for each 
migration path are compared, and the migration path with the smallest negative or largest 
positive number is selected as the best alternative path taking into account performance, 
cost, time, and technological risk. 
Step 7: Apply Selection and Reevaluate 
After selection of a system has been made, the decision needs to be periodically 
reviewed. As discussed in Chapter VI, these reviews should occur periodically, whenever 
new information is received, and when waypoints are reached or missed. Three waypoints 
for this example could be building access, computer system access, and installation access. 
The expected time to functionality of each of these goals would be estimated at the outset 
of the project and periodically reviewed to ensure progress toward the waypoint. 
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